Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal

This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts of empirical and theoretical papers on microeconomic aspects of information including the analysis of decisions in transactions where the costs of information transfer result in one party having different information than the other. Included in this topic are studies in which the cost of transferring or creating information lead to information asymmetries in principal-agent problems. The topics in this eJournal include topics D82, D83, D86 and D87 from Section D8 of the JEL classification system.

Click here to Browse our Electronic Library to view our archives of abstracts and associated full text papers published in this journal.

Sample Issue

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Advisory Board
Click on the individual's name below to view the advisory board member's author home page.

Oliver Hart

Bengt Holmstrom

Paul Milgrom

Paul M. Romer

Richard H. Thaler

Hal R. Varian