SSRN Author: Srinivas ArigapudiSrinivas Arigapudi SSRN Content
https://privwww.ssrn.com/author=4107597
https://privwww.ssrn.com/rss/en-usSun, 03 Jan 2021 01:04:15 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Sun, 03 Jan 2021 01:04:15 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: Instability of defection in the prisoner’s dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamicsWe study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically-plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case of k = 1 that is commonly studied in the literature.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3573341
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1976423.htmlSat, 02 Jan 2021 10:05:59 GMTREVISION: Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Analysis of Best Experienced Payoff DynamicsWe study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically-plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case of k = 1 that is commonly studied in the literature.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3573341
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1966266.htmlMon, 30 Nov 2020 09:36:12 GMTREVISION: Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Analysis of Best Experienced Payoff DynamicsWe study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically-plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case of k = 1 that is commonly studied in the literature.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3573341
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1940994.htmlMon, 14 Sep 2020 08:35:53 GMTREVISION: Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics AnalysisWe study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically-plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case of k = 1 that is commonly studied in the literature.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3573341
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1894363.htmlThu, 07 May 2020 11:49:46 GMT