SSRN Author: Michael Emmett BradyMichael Emmett Brady SSRN Content
https://privwww.ssrn.com/author=1033456
https://privwww.ssrn.com/rss/en-usThu, 23 Jul 2020 01:13:56 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Thu, 23 Jul 2020 01:13:56 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: The Main Result of Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument Analysis, in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, Is That V=V(a/h) =V(a/h1, h2, h3, h4……hn, hn+1….) While the Main Result of Chapter 26 Is That V(a/h)=w, 0≤w≤1, Where w=K/[K+I] and 1-w=I/[K+I]. No Economist or Philosopher in the 20th or 21st Century Was Able to Obtain Keynes’s FinThe misbelief that Keynes's concept of the evidential weight of the evidence, V=V(a/h), in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence, came about due to the failure of all philosophers and economists in the 20th and 21st centuries, who had written on Keynes’s concept of ’weight’, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, B Russell, and C D Broad, to take seriously Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 to chapter 26 of the A treatise on Probability, where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.”<br><br>The most severe errors were originally introduced by I J Good in 1950 and appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that. These errors were picked up by economists and made the foundation of their assessments of Keynes’s work starting in 1990 with a paper by Runde. It is quite impossible to add, subtract, divide, and multiply logical ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3612516
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1923901.htmlWed, 22 Jul 2020 08:41:35 GMTNew: Post Keynesian Economics Is Based on Joan Robinson’s Many Canards About Supposed Gaping Holes in Keynes’s Theory: The Real Problem Is Gaping Holes and Gross Ignorance in the Post Keynesian Understanding of Keynes’s a Treatise on ProbabilityThere is no Post Keynesian economist or allied philosopher who can comprehend the following, basic 100 year old fact-Keynes, building on Boole ‘s The Laws of Thought (1854), created an interval valued approach to probability, as well as a decision weight approach, the c coefficient, that re-expresses interval valued probability as non additive and non linear probability, that has nothing to do with radical uncertainty or ordinal probability as asserted continuously for 50 years.<br><br>Consider the example of R. Skidelsky. R. Skidelsky was very much like Joan Robinson in his academic skills, upon whom he has built his view of Keynes’s contributions. R. Skidelsky, like Joan Robinson, has admitted many times that he is mathematically illiterate, inept, and innumerant. This self admitted fact made Skidelsky very susceptible and receptive to the Frank P. Ramsey myth, recently resurrected by C. MIsak (2020). This myth purports that Ramsey, an 18 year old teenager who came to Cambridge ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3637692
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1923441.htmlTue, 21 Jul 2020 12:02:38 GMTNew: A Study of the Many, Many Conflicting ‘Tower of Babel’-Like Interpretations of Part I of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Made by Heterodox Economists: None of These ‘Interpretations’ Deal With Parts II-V of Keynes’s a Treatise on ProbabilityThe failure of all heterodox economists to read Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability, especially Part II, since Part III depends on Part II and Part V depends on Part III, explains the many, many different and conflicting types of probabilities that are climes to exist in the A Treatise on Probability, as well as the many, many different definitions of uncertainty concocted by ignorant heterodox economists whose work directly contradicts and conflicts with Keynes’s explicit definitions of uncertainty in the A Treatise on Probability on pp.309-315 and in the General Theory on pages 148 and 240, definitions which Keynes himself reemphasized and reinforced to H. Townshend in their correspondence in 1937 and 1938. A reading of this correspondence leads directly to the rejection of all current claims made about so called different types of probabilities (non comparable, non numerical, non measurable, incommensurable, unknown, ordinal, comparative, qualitative, rank ordered, etc.) ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3636653
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1922954.htmlMon, 20 Jul 2020 13:34:41 GMTNew: Keynes’s Use of Certainty Equivalent, Short Run Expectations in the General Theory, the Evidential Weight of the Argument, V(a/H)=W, 0≤w≤1, the Townshend -Keynes Exchanges of 1937–38, and Is-Lm: Rational Expectations Was a Special Case for Keynes if W=1 for Long Run ExpectationsThe failure of all economists and philosophers in the 20th and 21st centuries to grasp the formal, technical analysis of the 'weight of the arguments' analysis in chapters 6 and 26 of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability explains why the footnotes on pages 148 and 240 of the General Theory, the importance of which Keynes emphasized to Townshend in 1938, at the exact same time that Keynes was also engaged in a severe critique of Tinbergen’s misapplication of the limiting frequency interpretation of probability to business cycles using a multivariate normal probability distribution, have never been incorporated into Keynes’s theory of effective demand, the D-Z model, which served as the foundation for Keynes’s IS-LM(LP) model on pp .298-299 in Part IV of chapter 21 of the General Theory.<br><br>Keynes’s certainty equivalence for the expectations embodied in Z=wN +P and D=pO incorporated expectations as a function of uncertainty, where uncertainty is a function of the evidential weight ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3630046
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1922188.htmlFri, 17 Jul 2020 09:43:04 GMTNew: On the Impossibility That Any Academic Will Ever Understand Keynes’s 1931 Assessment of Ramsey’s Work in Probability, When Compared to His Own, Until Part II of the A Treatise on Probabilit y(1921) Has Been Read: Ramsey’s Subjective Theory of Probability (Precise, Exact, Numerical, Linear, Additive, Degree of Belief) Is a Special Case of Keynes’s LBy the time that Keynes’s logical theory of probability appeared in 1921 in his A Treatise on Probability (1921), Keynes had already used it in his Indian Currency and Finance,1913, personally at the Treaty of Versailles negotiations as the official representative of the British Treasury Department, and in his Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). Keynes was a millionaire by 1922. Keynes’s theory is an interval valued approach that can be applied in situations that require imprecise, inexact, non numerical, nonlinear, non additive, degree of rational belief. If the weight of the argument, w, is equal to, approaches, or is close to 1, 0≤w≤1, then Keynes’s theory reduces to the use of precise, exact, numerical, linear, additive, degrees of belief. This conclusion can only be reached if an academic has read and understood Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. The only academic in the 20th or 21st century who read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability was Theodore Hailperin, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3634436
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1922182.htmlFri, 17 Jul 2020 09:37:12 GMTNew: Keynes Spelt Out Exactly What 'Degree of Rational Belief ' Meant in His a Treatise on Probability (1921): Correcting the Severe Errors in Courgeau (2012)A very, very, very severe problem has been occurring repeatedly over the last 100 years in the social sciences and philosophy, when it comes to the question of understanding the meaning of Keynes ‘s logical theory of probability and his concept of rational degrees of belief. It is the failure of commentators on Keynes’s book to have actually read the A Treatise on Probability that is an ongoing problem.<br><br>Instead of reading the A Treatise on Probability, practically all social scientists and philosophers evaluate Keynes’s contribution based on a reading of F. P. Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 reviews ,which are combined with the introduction to the latest edition of the A Treatise on Probability, Volume 8 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, written by Richard B. Braithwaite, who claimed that he had read the A Treatise on Probability during the break between academic terms at Cambridge University in 1921, as reported in C. MIsak’s 2020 biography of Frank ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3633589
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1921480.htmlWed, 15 Jul 2020 17:23:09 GMTNew: After 100 Years, the Time Has Come to Acknowledge That Boole and Keynes Founded a Mathematically, Technically, and Logically Advanced Approach to Imprecise ProbabilityKeynes’s and Boole’s contributions to the theory of imprecise probability are not just “notions” or “suggestions” or “intuitions”. Keynes and Boole actually worked out problems in great detail in which they derive lower and upper probability bounds based on their foundation of propositional logic. Their work is very advanced and compares very favorably to work done up to the mid 1980’s, when T. Hailperin made major advances in the generalization of the Boole-Keynes approach. <br><br>Unfortunately,it appears that these contributions are not known,have been ignored,or are of a technical nature that is too difficult for present day researchers to master. Only Emil Borel in 1924 gave an answer, which was that it was too difficult for him to cover.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632526
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1921088.htmlTue, 14 Jul 2020 19:09:58 GMTNew: Keynes Rejected the Concepts of Probabilistic Truth, True Expected Values, True Expectations, True Probability Distributions and True Probabilities: ‘Probability Begins and Ends With Probability’ (Keynes, 1921)Ramsey’s many, many confusions and errors about Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability all stemmed from his failure to a) read more than just the first four chapters of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability(1921),b) his gross ignorance of Boole’s 1854 logical theory of probability that Keynes had built on in Parts II, III, IV, and V of the A Treatise on Probability, c) his complete and total ignorance of real world decision making under time constraint in financial markets(bond, money, stocks, commodity futures),government, industry and business, and d) his complete and total ignorance of the role that intuition and perception played in tournament chess competition under time constraint, a role that was taught to J M Keynes by his father, J N Keynes, a rated chess master who played first board for Cambridge University in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s.Keynes simply generalized the important role of intuition and perception in decision making in tournament chess competition under time ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3627339
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1918607.htmlWed, 08 Jul 2020 16:36:38 GMTNew: On Misak’s 2020 Story about Ramsey, Keynes,and Logical Probability: Keynes Never Took Ramsey’s Claims Seriously at Anytime in His LifetimeA myth has been in existence since 1922 about Keynes, Ramsey and the logical theory of probability that Keynes constructed in Parts I-V of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921.<br><br>This myth claims that Ramsey found major errors in logic and epistemology in Keynes’s work, which supposedly was about mysterious,unfathomable non measurable,non numerical Platonic probabilities that could only be intuited. Keynes supposedly, according to this myth, instantly realized that his theory had been decimated, annihilated and demolished by the 18 year old boy genius, Frank Ramsey. Keynes then supposedly retracted his theory in 1931 and supported the subjective theory of probability presented in 1926 by Ramsey in “Truth and Probability” thereafter.<br><br>This myth is the foundation for Robert Skidelsky’s Post Keynesian assessment of Keynes’s Theory of Probability and appears to be what S. Bradley presents as Keynes’s theory in the latest 2019 assessment of Keynes’s contributions in the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3625635
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1918057.htmlTue, 07 Jul 2020 16:29:41 GMTREVISION: How Did Clive Bell, One of Keynes’s Bloomsberry Artist Friends, Become a Recognized Expert on Keynes's a Treatise on Probability, given that He Had No Knowledge of Mathematical Logic, Statistics, Probability or Boolean Algebra?Clive Bell was an artist.There is no possible way that Clive Bell could have understood/advised Keynes about material appearing in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability or have had any understanding of the roles that intuition and perception played in Keynes’s logical theory of probability unless he had been a rated tournament chess player who understood the important role of intuition and perception, a role that could only be grasped by someone who has actually played Over-The-Board (OTB) tournament chess under time constraint (a clock). The belief that Clive Bell’s recollections/memories about his friendship with Keynes encompass a knowledge of Keynes’s logical theory of probability or Keynes’s concept of the role of intuition in decision making under time constraint are simply nonsense.<br><br>Bell has been cited in work done by C. MIsak in 2020, that is related to her biography on Frank Ramsey, whose subjective theory of probability was regarded by Keynes as a academic exercise that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632265
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1917597.htmlTue, 07 Jul 2020 10:22:27 GMTREVISION: George Box’s Realization, That All Models, Especially Statistical Models, Are Wrong Means That It Is Impossible for There to Be Any True Probabilities, True Models, True Theories, True Expectations or True (Accepted) Hypotheses: The Claims, Made By Rational Expectations Proponents About True Objective Probabilities, True Models, True Expectations, R. Muth’s 1961 paper in Econometrica is an example of an academic economist suffering from extreme and extraordinary ignorance about very basic scientific, statistical, methodological, epistemological, philosophical, and logical tenets. These tenets were all discussed rigorously by Haavelmo in his 1944 paper in Econometrica on methodological and epistemological issues related to the question about exactly what conclusions a statistical model using economic data could support as far as sound(never valid, right ,correct, true). Haavelmo’s entire 115 page article can be summarized briefly by George Box’s brief statement noted above .Muth’s belief ,that economists had derived true theories and true models is simple nonsense. What Muth should have argued in his 1961 article, but did not, is that rational expectations, when compared to its rivals,was a better model compared to the rival models in terms of minimizing its forecasting error.Of course, Muth would have had to have supported ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3623958
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1917198.htmlTue, 07 Jul 2020 08:03:58 GMTREVISION: George Box’s Realization, That All Models, Especially Statistical Models, Are Wrong Means That It Is Impossible for There to Be Any True Probabilities, True Models, True Theories, True Expectations or True (Accepted) Hypotheses: The Claims, Made By Rational Expectations Proponents About True Objective Probabilities, True Models, True Expectations, R. Muth’s 1961 paper in Econometrica is an example of an academic economist suffering from extreme and extraordinary ignorance about very basic scientific, statistical, methodological, epistemological, philosophical, and logical tenets. These tenets were all discussed rigorously by Koopman in his 1944 paper in Econometrica on methodological and epistemological issues related to the question about exactly what conclusions a statistical model using economic data could support as far as sound(never valid, right ,correct, true). Koopman’s entire 115 page article can be summarized briefly by George Box’s brief statement noted above .Muth’s belief ,that economists had derived true theories and true models is simple nonsense. What Muth should have argued in his 1961 article, but did not, is that rational expectations, when compared to its rivals,was a better model compared to the rival models in terms of minimizing its forecasting error.Of course, Muth would have had to have supported this ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3623958
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1916966.htmlThu, 02 Jul 2020 17:09:35 GMTREVISION: How Did Clive Bell, One of Keynes’s Bloomsberry Artist Friends, Become a Recognized Expert on Keynes's a Treatise on Probability, given that He Had No Knowledge of Mathematical Logic, Statistics, Probability or Boolean Algebra?Clive Bell was an artist.There is no possible way that Clive Bell could have understood/advised Keynes about material appearing in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability or have had any understanding of the roles that intuition and perception played in Keynes’s logical theory of probability unless he had been a rated tournament chess player who understood the important role of intuition and perception ,a role that could only be grasped by someone who has actually played Over -The -Board (OTB) tournament chess under time constraint(a clock).The belief that Clive Bell’s recollections/memories about his friendship with Keynes encompass a knowledge of Keynes’s logical theory of probability or Keynes’s concept of the role of intuition in decision making under time constraint are simply nonsense.<br><br>Bell has been cited in work done by C. MIsak in 2020 ,that is related to her biography on Frank Ramsey,whose subjective theory of probability was regarded by Keynes as a academic exercise ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632265
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1914907.htmlMon, 29 Jun 2020 17:58:30 GMTNew: The Myth that Ramsey Destroyed and Demolished Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability is Easily Dismissed as a Fairy Tale by Anyone who has read Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability (1921)Ramsey’s many ,many confusions and errors about Keynes’s logical theory of Probability all stem from his failure to a) read more than just the first four chapters of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability(1921),b) his gross ignorance of Boole’s logical theory of probability that Keynes had built on in Parts II,III,IV,and V of the A Treatise on Probability,c) his complete and total ignorance of real world decision making in financial markets(bond, money, stocks, commodity futures),government,industry and business,and d) his complete and total ignorance of the role that intuition and perception played in tournament chess competition under time constraint,a role that was taught to J M Keynes by his father ,J N Keynes,who was a rated chess master who played first board for Cambridge University in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s.<br><br>Anyone who has read Parts II,III,IV and V of the A Treatise on Probability can avoid making the type of errors that have recently shown up again in ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3618777
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1914626.htmlMon, 29 Jun 2020 13:09:17 GMTREVISION: J M Keynes’s IS-LM Model in Chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory on Pages 298–299: Some Examples of Cognitive Dissonance Among Economists Attempting to Deal With Keynes’s Innovation in 1936 in 2018–2019No macroeconomist in the 20th or 21st century has been able to deal effectively with Keynes’s original work done on his IS-LM model that he carried out between December ,1933 and February ,1936,where the final version appeared in the General Theory or in his deployment of that model in his reply to Jacob Viner in his February,1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article. <br><br>The major impediment to the grasping and understanding of Keynes’s IS-LM model for economists appears to be the claim, made by the astonishingly mathematically illiterate economist ,Joan Robinson, about having collaborated with Keynes on the writing of the General Theory. This belief is easily demonstrated to be false for any economist who reads pages 134-148 of Volume 14 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, where Keynes, in letters to J. Robinson, categorizes Joan Robinson’s understanding of his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest as being ”nonsense”. <br><br>These important pages ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3534905
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1914419.htmlMon, 29 Jun 2020 09:16:18 GMTNew: AP On I J Good’s Inability to Grasp Keynes’s Complete Analysis of the Weight of the Argument: The Logical Part of the Analysis of Evidential Weight of the Argument in Chapter 6 and the Mathematical Part of the Analysis in Chapter 26 in the A Treatise On ProbabilityThe mis-belief that Keynes ‘s concept of the evidential weight of the evidence ,V=V(a/h),in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence ,can be traced back to some 40 book and journal contributions made by I J Good between 1950 and 1990.Good completely overlooked Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 of chapter 6 to chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability,where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.” This would require a mathematical analysis and ,obviously, would require the restriction that V(a/h)=w, 0≤w≤1,so as to combine it with 0≤α≤1,where P(a/h)=α.<br><br>The most severe errors about chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability were originally introduced by I J Good starting in 1950 .His repeated errors appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that for the next 40 years.These errors were then picked up by economists and ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3614914
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1912788.htmlTue, 23 Jun 2020 21:21:16 GMTNew: On the Explicit Connections Between Keynes’s Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability(1921) and Chapter Four of the General Theory(1936):Keynes’s Method in the General Theory is Inexact Measurement and Approximation using Imprecise Probability from the A Treatise on ProbabilityKeynes, as he had done in all of his major works either directly or indirectly, from the 1913 Indian Currency and Finance through the General Theory in 1936, always used his A Treatise on Probability method and methodology of inexact measurement and approximation when performing a technical analysis. This involves Keynes’s use of interval valued probability to deal with the problem of uncertainty.<br><br>Uncertainty involves non(sub ) additive probability that introduces the immense complications of non additivity and non linearity into an analysis of decision making. Uncertainty, U, itself is a function only of the Evidential weight of the argument,w,or U=g(w). It occurs if Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument,V(a/h) =w ,where 0≤w≤1,is less than 1.A w<1 automatically creates some degree of uncertainty. In Keynes’s system of logical probability, there is no other way of modelling uncertainty except as an a)interval estimate or a b) decision weight, like his conventional ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3614429
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1912694.htmlTue, 23 Jun 2020 15:59:59 GMTREVISION: The Main Result of Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument Analysis, in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, Is That V=V(a/H) =V(a/h1, h2, h3, h4……Hn, hn+1….) While the Main Result of Chapter 26 Is That V(a/H)=W, 0≤w≤1, Where W=K/[K+i] and 1-W=I/[K+I]. No Economist or Philosopher in the 20th or 21st Century Was Able to Obtain Keynes’s FinThe misbelief that Keynes's concept of the evidential weight of the evidence, V=V(a/h), in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence, came about due to the failure of all philosophers and economists in the 20th and 21st centuries, who had written on Keynes’s concept of ’weight’, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, B Russell, and C D Broad, to take seriously Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 to chapter 26 of the A treatise on Probability, where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.”<br><br>The most severe errors were originally introduced by I J Good in 1950 and appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that. These errors were picked up by economists and made the foundation of their assessments of Keynes’s work starting in 1990 with a paper by Runde. It is quite impossible to add, subtract, divide, and multiply logical ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3612516
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1912483.htmlTue, 23 Jun 2020 09:16:26 GMTNew: A Comparison of J. M. Keynes’s Logical Approach to Probability and Any ‘Objective Bayesian’ Approach to Probability Needs to Incorporate All Five Parts of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability, Not Just Part IPhilosophers, historians, economists, decision theorists, and psychologists have been repeating a very severe error of omission for nearly a hundred years that was originally made by the French mathematician Emile Borel in his 1924 review of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. Borel decided to skip Parts II through V of the A treatise on Probability. He explicitly apologized to Keynes at the beginning of his review for his decision involved in skipping Part II, acknowledging to Keynes, correctly, that Part II was the most important part of the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Borel’s acknowledgment and apology are, in fact, an understatement, because without an understanding of Part II,it is impossible to understand Keynes’s theory of decision making and the role played by that theory in the General Theory(1936). This all comes out in the Keynes-Townshend exchanges of 1937 and 1938, where Keynes makes it crystal clear to Townshend that his theory of liquidity preference is built on ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3609624
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1910745.htmlThu, 18 Jun 2020 14:24:50 GMTNew: J M Keynes’s Contribution to Solving the Certainty Effect Problem: How Some Philosophers Overlooked Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Weight and Risk, CJ M Keynes solved the problems of the certainty, reflection, translation, and preference reversal effects long before these effects were specified in the post world war II literature by psychologists. Keynes recognized in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability (1921; p.313) that all of these effects were a result of non linear probability preferences on the part of the decision maker.<br><br>An understanding of Keynes’s contribution would have helped philosophers, such as I. Levi and B. Weatherson, to deal with this problem.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3609066
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1910512.htmlThu, 18 Jun 2020 09:26:10 GMTNew: Keynes’s Application of Inexact Measurement and Approximation in Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability Directly Conflicts with R .O’Donnell’s Claims in His Chapter 3 concerning Keynes’s Approach to Measurement in His 1989 Book, 'Keynes, Philosophy, Economics, and Politics'The claim that Keynes’s non numerical probabilities are ordinal probabilities was shown to be mathematically impossible by Keynes himself in Part II in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability(1921) on pp.160-163 and in chapter 17 on pp.186-194,since Keynes’s non numerical probabilities are identical to Boole’s constituent probabilities. Keynes improved on Boole’s technique and was able to solve Boolean problems much quicker than it took Boole to solve the problems.Part II of the A Treatise on Probability is nearly identical to the analysis provided in his two Cambridge University Fellowships in 1907 and 1908. <br><br>R. O’Donnell(1989,p.60) attempted to analyze a part of page 160 of the A Treatise on Probability that dealt with Keynes’s inexact measurement and approximation approach using interval probability ,but failed to comprehend that the discussion directly contradicts his claims concerning ordinal probability made earlier in his chapter 3 on pp.50-59.His claim that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3597804
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1905380.htmlFri, 05 Jun 2020 14:00:47 GMTNew: The Restricted Role of Caprice (Whim) in J M Keynes’s Interval Valued Theory of Probability in the A Treatise on Probability, General Theory, and in the Keynes-Townshend Correspondence of 1937–1938Keynes recognized that there were a few cases where his rational analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and risk using: <br><br>(a) interval valued probability in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability,<br><br>(b) decision weights in Part IV of the A Treatise on Probability ,or <br><br>(c) safety first, based on the use of Chebyshev’s Inequality, in Part V of the A Treatise on Probability, would result in a stalemate. <br><br>Although Keynes introduced his concept of caprice to deal with this problem in Part I in chapter III on p.30 of the A Treatise on Probability, a complete understanding requires a mastery of his mathematical analysis in Chapter XV, where Keynes presented part of his mathematical analysis of his Boolean based theory of imprecise, indeterminate interval valued probability. Once the link between page 30 of Chapter III and Pages 160-163 of Chapter XV is understood, then Keynes’s use of caprice in the General Theory and the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3590871
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1902744.htmlFri, 29 May 2020 16:24:07 GMTREVISION: On Keynes’s Painstaking Slow Instruction of Harrod on the Technical Aspects of His IS-LM Model in July-September, 1935:Harrod Only Finally Understood Keynes’s IS-LM Model After He Had Read the Postscript to Keynes’s Letter of August 27th, 1935 to HarrodKeynes spent a tremendous amount of time and energy attempting to tutor Harrod on the mechanics of his IS-LM model between July to September, 1935. Keynes’s painstaking slow attempts finally led Keynes in desperation to write a three point postscript to his letter of August, 1935, that is written at a grammar school level of exposition. Only after reading Keynes’s three point postscript, written at a grammar school level of exposition, did Harrod finally grasp the point that Keynes was making, which is that it is impossible for there to be any equilibrium in Aggregate (Effective) Demand, Y, interest rate, r, space of Investment(I) and Savings(S) because the IS curve was a SINGLE, downward sloping line in (Y,r) space. There is ,obviously, a missing equation.<br><br>Harrod’s continual resort to ceteris paribus assumptions about a constant or fixed level of aggregate income ,Y, in order to support the existing classical (neoclassical ) theory of the rate of interest in (r;I,S ) space, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3550652
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1901042.htmlTue, 26 May 2020 10:26:43 GMTNew: Can Shiozawa’s, Morioka’s and Taniuchi’s Microfoundations for Evolutionary Economics (2019) Serve As the Microfoundations for “… Post-Keynesian Economics “ (2019, p.vii)? The Answer Is Definitely Yes if Post –Keynesians Can Break Away From Joan Robinson’s Anti-Mathematical, Anti-Formalist ViewsAlthough Herbert Simon never read J M Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) or understood the necessary connections between the General Theory (1936) and the A Treatise on Probability, he independently discovered an alternate formulation that was equivalent to Keynes’s approach, but nowhere as technically advanced. Simon’s approach thus leads to the same kind of conclusions and results that Keynes provided in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921. <br><br> On p.xii, Shiozawa correctly states that “Bounded rationality is the basis of all evolutions of economic entities…” and “Because of bounded rationality, any existing entities are not optimal at any time.”, it will be necessary to connect Keynes’s degree of logical probability, P(a/h) =α, where α is a degree of rational belief, which is defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1, to Simon’s work. Keynes’s interval valued probability is always bounded below and above by lower and upper probabilities. This is what Keynes meant ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3557716
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1885687.htmlTue, 14 Apr 2020 15:33:14 GMTREVISION: Clower and His 'The Effective Demand Fraud': An Example of What Happens to a Competent Economist Who Takes Joan Robinson's Myth of Keynes As a Marshallian SeriouslyRobert Clower’s “The Effective Demand Fraud” is a good example of what can happen when a solid macroeconomist takes the myths of Joan Robinson about J. M. Keynes and the General Theory too seriously. The basis for many of Robinson’s many myths about Keynes was her claim that Keynes was a rabid Marshallian, who would only use partial equilibrium analysis because Keynes realized that a formal, mathematical, simultaneous, general equilibrium, macroeconomic model of the economy was impossible to use due to the pervasive existence of radical, fundamental and irreducible uncertainty.<br><br>Exactly the opposite is the case. Keynes was heavily influenced in his views about how to apply and use mathematics in economics by William Ernest Johnson and A C Pigou, as well as Marshall. Keynes was a Johnsonian, Pigouvian, and Marshallian economist. He was never, ever simply a Marshallian economist.<br><br>Clower completely overlooks Keynes’s IS-LP(LM) model in chapters 15 and 21 of the General ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3065376
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1885119.htmlMon, 13 Apr 2020 14:43:51 GMTREVISION: On Keynes’s Painstaking Slow Instruction of Harrod on the Technical Aspects of His IS-LM Model in July-September, 1935:Harrod Only Finally Understood Keynes’s IS-LM Model After He Had Read the Postscript to Keynes’s Letter of August 27th, 1935 to HarrodKeynes spend a tremendous amount of time and energy attempting to tutor Harrod on the mechanics of his IS-LM model between July to September ,1935. Keynes’s painstaking slow attempts finally led Keynes in desperation to write a three point postscript to his letter of August,1935, that is written at a grammar school level of exposition. Only after reading Keynes’s three point postscript, written at a grammar school level of exposition, did Harrod finally grasp the point that Keynes was making, which is that it is impossible for there to be any equilibrium in Aggregate(Effective) Demand,Y,interest rate,r, space of Investment(I) and Savings(S) because the IS curve was a SINGLE, downward sloping line in (Y,r) space. There is ,obviously, a missing equation.<br><br>Harrod’s continual resort to ceteris paribus assumptions about a constant or fixed level of aggregate income ,Y, in order to support the existing classical (neoclassical ) theory of the rate of interest in (r;I,S ) space, is ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3550652
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1881377.htmlWed, 01 Apr 2020 19:33:28 GMTNew: Comparing Orthodox (N. G. Mankiw) and Heterodox (M. Zafirovski) Economist Views of Adam Smith, the Invisible Hand of the Market, and Laissez Faire: Both Views Completely Overlook the Very Severe Detrimental Impacts on the Macro Economy Created by Smith’s Upper Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and ProjectorsThe degree to which Adam Smith’s view, that the opulence of any nation at the macro level was the result of, and was determined by, large numbers of “sober” people practicing the Virtue of Prudence, which Smith demonstrated in Part VI of the Sixth Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790 was connected to the practice of the other Virtues of Self Command( a combination of Temperance and Courage combined), Justice and Benevolence, was ever understood by any economist was severely questioned by Gavin Kennedy in the 21st century. Kennedy argued, in his books, journal articles, and Blog, titled “Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy”, that practically no living economist understood Smith’s approach.<br><br>This can be confirmed by analyzing the assessment of Adam Smith made by a highly recognized Orthodox economist, N. Gregory Mankiw, and the assessment made by a highly recognized Heterodox economist, Milan Zafirovski. Both authors agree completely that Smith’s views of the economic ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3543000
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1877278.htmlThu, 19 Mar 2020 10:22:55 GMTNew: Adam Smith’s Sixth Edition of
<i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i> in 1790 was specifically devised to refute Jeremy Bentham’s 1787 attacks on Virtue Ethics and
<i>The Wealth of Nations</i> as contained in his Utilitarian tracts
<i>The Principles of Morals and Legislation and In Defense of Usury</i>Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian tracts The Principles of Morals and Legislation and In Defense of Usury contains an explicit attack on Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations on pages 8-23 in chapter Two of The Principles of Morals and Legislation, as well as on pages 167-168 and 187-188.Bentham argues repeatedly on these pages that all systems of moral philosophy based on sympathy and antipathy are flawed. Bentham’s conclusion is that ethics can only be based on the principle of utility alone and nothing else.<br><br>Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments is based on sympathy ,but not antipathy. However, the major foundation for The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the virtue of prudence, since ,without prudence, sympathy can’t be backed up with actions and none of the later virtues can be successfully implemented. Bentham’s Utilitarian maximizing utility concept has nothing whatsoever to do with the virtue of prudence and is intended to replace virtue ethics ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3538973
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1875580.htmlFri, 13 Mar 2020 14:39:53 GMTREVISION: J M Keynes’s Is-Lm Model in Chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory on Pages 298–299: Some Examples of Cognitive Dissonance Among Economists Attempting to Deal With Keynes’s Innovation in 1936 in 2018–2019No macroeconomist in the 20th or 21st century has been able to deal effectively with Keynes’s original work done on his IS-LM model that he carried out between December ,1933 and February ,1936,where the final version appeared in the General Theory or in his deployment of that model in his reply to Jacob Viner in his February,1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article. <br><br>The major impediment to the grasping and understanding of Keynes’s IS-LM model for economists appears to be the claim, made by the astonishingly mathematically illiterate economist ,Joan Robinson, about having collaborated with Keynes on the writing of the General Theory. This belief is easily demonstrated to be false for any economist who reads pages 134-148 of Volume 14 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, where Keynes, in letters to J. Robinson, categorizes Joan Robinson’s understanding of his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest as being ”nonsense”. <br><br>These important pages ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3534905
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1874181.htmlMon, 09 Mar 2020 17:00:40 GMTNew: Some Examples of 21st Century Philosophers Who Have Written About Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability, but Have Skipped Part II of the A Treatise on Probability, Where Keynes Presented His Interval – Valued Approach to ProbabilityNearly one hundred years after Keynes published his A Treatise on Probability in 1921,it appears that practically no philosophers have read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in either the 20th or 21st centuries. This simply means that no modern day philosopher is in any position to recognize that Keynes’s work on his interval valued approach to imprecise probability in 1907,1908 and 1921 makes him the founder, along with G Boole’s contributions in his 1854 The Laws of Thought ,of the imprecise theory of probability long before Koopman’s work in 1940 or the work of I. J. Good, C. Smith ,or H.E. Kyburg in the early 1960’s.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3534557
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1874011.htmlMon, 09 Mar 2020 13:58:52 GMTNew: A Historical Summary of How a Severe Misinterpretation of the only Diagram in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in Chapter III on Page 39 Spread to Philosophers: From G. Meeks (1976) to S.Dow and V.Chick (2012) to S.Bradley(2019)G. Meeks’s original analysis of the diagram on Page 39 (Page 42 of the CWJMK version in 1973) in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability in 1976 erred in claiming that Keynes was illustrating ordinal,or rank order, probability measurement. Keynes was actually illustrating interval valued probability, not ordinal probability. Keynes made this very clear in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability in Part II on pp.160-163, as well as in chapters 17, 20, 22, 26, 29, and 30, which all deal with Keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation, using lower and upper bounds. <br><br>Meeks never read Part II or Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability. Meeks’s work was then passed down to R. Skidelsky, A. Carabelli, R. O’Donnell, and many, many other academics, who were attending or were associated with Cambridge University. From this stage, her erroneous work was passed down to S. Dow and V. Chick, and finally to S. Bradley. <br><br>This erroneous and mistaken view of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3532241
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1872725.htmlThu, 05 Mar 2020 16:55:08 GMTNew: Adam Smith’s ‘Prudent Man’ of the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the ‘Frugal Man’ of the Wealth of Nations Are One and the Same Man: Economists Fail to Grasp That the Conduct of Smith’s Prudent Man and His Frugal Man Must Always by Necessity Come Before Any Actions by Smith’s ‘Benevolent’ ManIt is simply impossible for benevolence to precede prudence because it is prudence that allows one to create a surplus that can be used later for benevolence. One can’t give what one does not have. Sympathy without the application of prudence first is simply a completely ineffective sentiment. Only prudence allows one to follow up sympathy with actions. One can imagine a poor Good Samaritan with no horse, no wine, no oil, and no bag of silver coins having sympathy for the badly beaten and robbed traveler on the very dangerous road to Jericho, but, because of his imprudent behavior in the past, not being able to act benevolently. The Good Samaritan would then go down in history as the Sympathetic Samaritan, who could take no actions of any importance to mitigate the sufferings of the beaten man. <br><br> Economists have horribly misconstrued Smith’s story of the baker, brewer and butcher. The baker, brewer and butcher can’t possibly act benevolently in the future unless they can earn ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3529093
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1870585.htmlFri, 28 Feb 2020 10:17:28 GMTREVISION: There Never Was Any Real ‘Das Adam Smith Problem.’ The Virtues of Prudence and Benevolence, Expressed as Love Your Neighbor as You Love Yourself (Self Love), as Proclaimed by Jesus Christ, Were the Main Foundation for Both of Smith’s Books CombinedA major confusion has been going on among academics for about 2 and ½ centuries with respect to assessments of Adam Smith’s use of the term self-interest. Economists have been confusing the Virtue of Prudence, which incorporates self-love or self-interest, emphasized by all spiritual leaders and teachers, including Adam Smith, with Jeremy Bentham’s maximization of utility. The Virtue of Prudence has nothing to do with the maximization of utility, assuming that such a task could be accomplished, which is very doubtful, given the lack of sufficient knowledge to estimate probabilities and the utility of outcomes.<br><br>There are three separate approaches involved. Adam Smith recognized the priority of prudence above all other virtues, which are related to the Virtue of prudence. Smith accepts Jesus Christ’s precise and concise summary, that you should love your neighbor as you love yourself. "…you love yourself" is the virtue of prudence. "Love your neighbor..." Is the virtue of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3503811
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1868367.htmlThu, 20 Feb 2020 10:55:10 GMTNew: Keynesian Uncertainty Can Only Be Represented by Imprecise, Non Additive, Interval Valued Probability or Decision Weights Like Keynes’s C: Ordinal Probability Can’t Represent Keynesian UncertaintyJ M Keynes’s two logical relations of rational degree of probability, α, 0≤α≤1 and Evidential Weight of the Argument, w, 0≤w≤1, where w measures the degree of completeness of the evidence, can’t be represented or associated with ordinal probability, although Keynes’s theory of probability can easily deal with ordinal probability with the aid of Keynes’s principle of indifference if symmetries are present. α can be, in some limited instances, represented by a numerical, precise, definite, exact, additive probability if, and only if, w=1, although, in general, for w<1, it must be represented by an non additive interval estimate of probability or by a decision weight, like Keynes’s original, path breaking innovation of his conventional coefficient, c.<br><br>Nowhere in Boole’s 1854 The Laws of Thought is any concept of ordinal probability discussed analyzed or applied in any detail. This is because ordinal probability can never deal with overlapping estimates of probability, which ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3523572
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1867607.htmlTue, 18 Feb 2020 10:04:40 GMTREVISION: How J M Keynes Split His Original IS-LP(LM) Model of His Student Lectures of December, 1933 and His Mid-1934 Draft Copy of the General Theory into Two Separate Models in 1936: The Revised IS-LP(LM) Model of Chapter 21 and the Expected D-Z Model of Chapter 20 in the General TheoryIn late 1933, Keynes was facing a serious problem. The problem was how to integrate his A treatise on probability, 1921 work on expectations, interval valued probability, and the weight of the evidence, V(a/h) =w, 0≤w≤1, into his IS-LP(LM) model.<br><br>Keynes’s first attempt was to integrate W, the State of the News, where W = the change in w, the weight of the evidence, over time. However, this was unsatisfactory because this did not correctly integrate expectations into the definitions of the Y, C, and I variables, which were actual, realized values. In mid-1934, Keynes eliminate W and incorporated E, where E was now defined as the “state of long-term expectation (or confidence).” This also did not work because E could not be integrated into the definitions of the Y, C, and I variables, since the model dealt with the actual, realized values of the Y, C, and I variables.<br><br>Keynes needed another, separate model dealing only with expectations and uncertainty from which the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3209648
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1866649.htmlThu, 13 Feb 2020 17:22:01 GMTNew: On Keynes’s November 9th,1936 Decision to Qualify His December 12,1935 Acknowledgement to J. Robinson of Her Help Contained in the Preface to the General Theory in Correspondence: Robinson’s Extraordinary Mathematical Illiteracy Meant that It Was Simply Impossible for Her to Understand Keynes’s TheoryKeynes discovered in correspondence with Joan Robinson in the September-October-November, 1936 time period that she did not have the technical knowledge of economics or mathematics that was needed in order to be able to grasp and understand his General Theory, which revolved around his Liquidity Preference theory of the rate of interest.<br><br>Joan Robinson could understand simple constructs like q = f(p), M=L(r) , I=f(r) or if Y=C +I and Y= C+S, then I=S. However, she could not follow Keynes’s liquidity preference equation on page 199, that M=M1+M2=L1 (r)+L2 (Y)=L, the logical theory of the multiplier on pages 122-123 or the preliminary mathematical presentations on pages 114-115, 137, the definition of uncertainty as an inverse function of the weight of the argument from chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, or the Appendix to chapter 19, chapter 20, or chapter 21 of the General Theory. Joan Robinson repeatedly claimed that because she knew no mathematics, she had to think ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3521754
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1866325.htmlWed, 12 Feb 2020 18:43:53 GMTNew: The Claim That the Diagram on Page 39 of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability(1921) Represents ‘Keynes’s View of Probability’ (S. Bradley, 2019), Has No Support: It Represents a Very Brief Introduction to Part II of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability On Non Additive ProbabilityA major error in analyzing how Keynes operationalized his logical theory of probability in 1921 is to assume that Keynes’s theoretical structure is presented by him at the end of Chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability on pp. 38-40, which contains a diagram on page 39 that Keynes himself characterized as being a “brief” illustration that would be supplemented later with a “detailed" analysis in Part II. Economists, who have written on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, such as G. Meeks, D. Moggridge, R. Skidelsky, R. O’donnell, A. Carabelli, A. Fitzgibbons, and many, many others, have erred by failing to cover Keynes’s non additive, non linear approach, using Boole’s interval valued probability, which is based on lower and upper probability bounds and represents a detailed approach to imprecise probability, in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability. Instead, it is erroneously argued, on the basis of this diagram alone, that Keynes’s approach was an ordinal theory ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3518231
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1863826.htmlWed, 05 Feb 2020 12:26:52 GMTREVISION: Chapter 13 of the General Theory Does not Contain J M Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest: A Study of the Erroneous Use and Abuse of Chapter 13 of the General Theory from R. Hawtrey, D. Robertson, J. Viner, J. Robinson to J. AhiakporA major source of confusion about Keynes’s Liquidity Preference theory of the rate of interest is the failure of readers of the General Theory to recognize that chapter 13 is an introductory chapter that lays the ground work and foundations for chapter 15. Keynes’s actual theory is presented in chapters 15. All of the elements are then brought together in chapter 21 in section 4 on pp. 298-299. <br><br>Keynes pointed out on pp.297-298 of the General Theory that “Too large a proportion of recent 'mathematical' economics are merely concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols.”<br><br>This is precisely the point made by Keynes against the Marshallian approach of Pigou in his The Theory of Unemployment (July, 1933), where the simplifications of ceteris paribus and partial equilibrium lead to the specifications of functions ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3277788
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1862888.htmlSun, 02 Feb 2020 15:15:13 GMTNew: On Some Possible Explanations for the Continuing Denial of the Existence of Keynes’s IS-LM Model in Section 4 of Chapter 21 of the General Theory: Propaganda (from Joan Robinson), Ignorance (of the Keynes-Harrod Correspondence in Volume 13 Of the CWJMK in Late 1935), Anchoring (on Keynes’s Mention of Robinson’s Name in the Preface to the General ThThe following is a summary of Keynes’s main contribution in his General Theory. The General Theory traces its initial beginning to December, 1933. J. M. Keynes presented his first public version of his IS -LM model in December,1933 in a lecture to his students at Cambridge University, England. However, Keynes’s IS-LM model went through a number of different versions that incorporated various improvements before the final version was inserted into Section Four of Chapter 21 of the General Theory in February,1936.<br><br>A second version appeared in 1934 in the first draft of the General Theory where Keynes had replaced his state of the news variable, W, with E, where E represented the confidence a decision maker had in his expectations about future prices and profits. In the third, late 1935 version of his IS-LM model, available from Lorie Tarshis’s student notes, Keynes had incorporated Y into the LM equation.<br><br> Keynes’s final, fourth version adds an explicit mpc term and ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3514060
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1862657.htmlSat, 01 Feb 2020 23:30:09 GMTNew: On the Shocking Ignorance of Economists of G. Boole’s Logical Theory of Probability in His 1854 the Laws of Thought: Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in the 1921 a Treatise on Probability Is Built Entirely on BooleKeynes’s logical theory of probability was NOT the first explicit and detailed approach to logical probability. George Boole was the first academic to provide an explicit, systematic and detailed logical probability approach in history. Keynes’s own logical theory was built on both the work of Boole and the work of William E. Johnson. <br><br>This paper will deal with the fact that there are no economists in either the 20th or 21st centuries who have the slightest inkling about how Keynes built his logical theory of probability and who were the scholars whom Keynes built his approach to logical probability on. For instance, M Friedman thought that Keynes was a subjectivist. This is a common error made on the part of orthodox economists. <br><br>However, an even greater lacuna occurs among heterodox economists,who are completely ignorant of the role of Boole. <br><br><br>
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3510036
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1858552.htmlThu, 16 Jan 2020 16:57:38 GMTNew: J M Keynes’s Method in the A Treatise on Probability, Inexact Measurement and Approximation Using Non Additive Upper and Lower Probabilities, Is a Formal, Inductive Logic Built on G. Boole’s Original Boolean Algebra and Logic: It Has Nothing to Do With ‘…A Given List of Possible Behaviors.’J.M. Keynes’s method in the A Treatise on Probability, inexact measurement and approximation using non additive upper and lower probabilities, is a formal, inductive logic built on G. Boole’s original Boolean Algebra and Logic. It has nothing to do with "…a given list of possible behaviors. ” (Almeida, no date). Keynes’s approach uses intuition, induction, pattern recognition and analogy as a foundation, using different degrees of similarity and dissimilarity connecting the past to the future, to analyze and solve existing problems with major future implications. The researcher, using Keynesian induction and intuition, is able to discover relevant connections from the past that may very likely play a deciding role in unsolved problems extending and dealing with the future. A researcher does not create a solution out of nothing based on his imagining things about the future whimsically when he is daydreaming or sleeping and having dreams.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3509048
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1857994.htmlWed, 15 Jan 2020 11:12:18 GMTREVISION: There Never Was Any Real ‘Das Adam Smith Problem.’ The Virtues of Prudence and Benevolence, Expressed As Love Your Neighbor As You Love Yourself (Self Love), As Proclaimed by Jesus Christ, Were the Main Foundation for Both of Smith’s BooksA major confusion has been going on among academics for about 2 and ½ centuries with respect to assessments of Adam Smith’s use of the term self-interest. Economists have been confusing the Virtue of Prudence, which incorporates self-love or self-interest, emphasized by all spiritual leaders and teachers, including Adam Smith, with Jeremy Bentham’s maximization of utility. The Virtue of Prudence has nothing to do with the maximization of utility, assuming that such a task could be accomplished, which is very doubtful, given the lack of sufficient knowledge to estimate probabilities and the utility of outcomes.<br><br>There are three separate approaches involved. Adam Smith recognized the priority of prudence above all other virtues, which are related to the Virtue of prudence. Smith accepts Jesus Christ’s precise and concise summary, that you should love your neighbor as you love yourself. "…you love yourself" is the virtue of prudence. "Love your neighbor..." Is the virtue of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3503811
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1855141.htmlMon, 06 Jan 2020 11:51:56 GMTREVISION: On the J M Keynes-Joan Robinson Correspondence Between September and November, 1936: How Keynes Finally Came to Realize That Joan Robinson Had No Understanding Whatsoever About His Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest or the General TheoryIn the course of examining papers sent to him by Joan Robinson for review and comments before publication in late 1936, Keynes discovered that Joan Robinson had absolutely no understanding whatsoever about his theory of the rate of interest, which was based on the Liquidity Preference Function, in the General Theory. Despite repeated attempts by Keynes to correct her errors, Joan Robinson persisted in resisting Keynes’s attempt to repair her deeply flawed work on liquidity preference. Keynes finally realized in November 1936 that his acknowledgment of her on page xii of the General Theory regarding her comments on the draft copies of the General Theory he had sent her was mistaken. Keynes had no alternative in his letter to J. Robinson of November 9th, 1936, but to state to her bluntly that “… your argument as it stands is most certainly nonsense.” Robinson’s argument was that the rate of interest is determined by the demand and supply of money alone.<br><br>Keynes had finally come ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3177324
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1854220.htmlThu, 02 Jan 2020 11:08:50 GMTREVISION: The University of Chicago’s Economics Department Approach Is Based on the Philosophy of Jeremy Bentham’s Rational Utility Maximizer: It Has Nothing to Do with the Virtue Ethics Approach to Self Interest of Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments or the Wealth of NationsThe following assessment of Adam Smith's approach to economics is completely erroneous, but would be a very exact and accurate description of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian approach to economics:<br><br>"How do you get your dinner?" That is the basic question of economics. When economist and philosopher Adam Smith proclaimed that all our actions were motivated by self-interest, he used the example of the baker and the butcher as he laid the foundations for "economic man." He argued that the baker and butcher didn't give bread and meat out of the goodness of their hearts. It's an ironic point of view coming from a bachelor who lived with his mother for most of his life ― a woman who cooked his dinner every night.” (Marcal, K., 2017).<br><br>The University of Chicago Economics Department approach is based on the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham’s rational utility maximizer, as set out by Bentham in 1787 in his The Principles of Morals and Legislation and in his Defense of Usury. This ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3500349
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1853901.htmlTue, 31 Dec 2019 15:08:17 GMTREVISION: The University of Chicago’s Economics Department Approach Is Based on the Philosophy of Jeremy Bentham’s Rational Utility maximizer:It Has Nothing to Do with the Virtue Ethics Approach to Self Interest of Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments or the Wealth of NationsThe following assessment of Adam Smith approach to economics is completely erroneous, but would be a very exact and accurate description of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian approach to economics:<br><br>‘How do you get your dinner? That is the basic question of economics. When economist and philosopher Adam Smith proclaimed that all our actions were motivated by self-interest, he used the example of the baker and the butcher as he laid the foundations for 'economic man.' He argued that the baker and butcher didn't give bread and meat out of the goodness of their hearts. It's an ironic point of view coming from a bachelor who lived with his mother for most of his life ― a woman who cooked his dinner every night.” (Marcal, K., 2017).<br><br>The University of Chicago Economics Department approach is based on the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham’s rational utility maximizer, as set out by Bentham in 1787 in his The Principles of Morals and Legislation and his In Defense of Usury. This approach ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3500349
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1853507.htmlMon, 30 Dec 2019 15:35:47 GMTREVISION: Confusing Metaphors With Mathematics in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, When Analyzing Keynes’s Modeling of the Evidential Weight of the Argument V(a/h ), Leads to confusion: If V(a/h)=w, As Defined in Chapter 26, Where 0≤w≤1, Then It Is Mathematically Impossible That Keynes’s Weight Is Monotonically IncreasingPhilosophers and economists continue to erroneously claim that Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument, V(a/h) and/or his degree of the weight of the evidence, w, is always increasing monotonically over time based on a reading of a metaphor Keynes used in chapter 6 to help explain why the Evidential Weight of the Argument is different from probability. The Evidential Weight of the Argument will increase if there is additional relevant evidence, data, information or knowledge. It is also the case that we know more if we later discover additional relevant evidence that establishes that we, in fact, did not know what we thought we knew .What is required to actually measure weight mathematically ,as opposed to logical considerations, is an index that is normalized on the unit interval between 0 and 1 that is identical to the normalization of probability on the unit interval between 0 and 1 so that one can talk about degrees. Any attempt to discuss Keynes’s concept of weight is an ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3270409
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1853124.htmlSat, 28 Dec 2019 16:39:04 GMTREVISION: Keynes’s Major Result From Part II of the A Treatise on Probability Was That, Given That Numerical Probabilities Are Additive, Then Non Numerical Probabilities Must Be Non Additive: Non Additivity Is a Sufficient Condition for Some Degree of Uncertainty to ExistKeynes’s major accomplishment in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability (1921),which he also accomplished in the 1907 and 1908 Fellowship Dissertation versions, was to show that the addition property of the purely mathematical calculus of probability could only be operational in certain circumstances where the evidential weight of the argument, V(a/h) =degree w, was equal to a w of 1,where 0≤w≤1, so that the decision maker had complete data/evidence set.All relevant information or evidence had be known before any decision had to be made. Thus, all numerical probabilities are additive, so that they would sum to 1. However, there were also non numerical probabilities, which were non additive because of the existence of missing, relevant data or evidence, that would not sum to 1. By far the most important case was sub additive,as opposed to super additive, probabilities, which would sum to less than 1. Note the obvious fact that ordinal probabilities are not only not non additive, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3498783
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1852548.htmlTue, 24 Dec 2019 08:35:29 GMTREVISION: Keynes’s Major Result From Part II of the A Treatise on Probability Was That, Given That Numerical Probabilities Are Additive, Then Non Numerical Probabilities Must Be Non Additive: Non Additivity Is a Sufficient Condition for Some Degree of Uncertainty to ExistKeynes’s major accomplishment in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability (1921),which he also accomplished in the 1907 and 1908 Fellowship Dissertation versions, was to show that the addition property of the purely mathematical calculus of probability could only be operational in certain circumstances where the evidential weight of the argument, V(a/h) =degree w, was equal to a w of 1,where 0≤w≤1, so that the decision maker had complete data/evidence set.All relevant information or evidence had be known before any decision had to be made. Thus, all numerical probabilities are additive, so that they would sum to 1. However, there were also non numerical probabilities, which were non additive because of the existence of missing, relevant data or evidence, that would not sum to 1. By far the most important case was sub additive,as opposed to super additive, probabilities, which would sum to less than 1. Note the obvious fact that ordinal probabilities are not only not non additive, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3498783
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1852381.htmlMon, 23 Dec 2019 15:31:21 GMTREVISION: The Role of Ignorance About Keynes’s Inexact, Approximation Approach to Measurement in the A Treatise on Probability in the Keynes-Tinbergen Exchanges of 1938–1940There is no evidence that J. Tinbergen ever read the technical analysis provided by J. M. Keynes in Parts II and V of the A Treatise on Probability in the 1938-1940 time period or at any later time in his life. The same conclusion holds for econometricians in general. They simply do not understand what Keynes’s Inexact, Approximation Approach to Measurement in the A Treatise on Probability entails. <br><br>Tinbergen and Keynes held diametrically opposed positions on measurement. Tinbergen’s approach to measurement was guided by the Limiting Frequency interpretation of probability while Keynes’s approach followed the logical approach of George Boole. Tinbergen’s physics background led him to deploy an exact approach to measurement based on the specification of probability distributions, like the normal and lognormal, with exact and precisely defined measurements. All probabilities were assumed to be well defined, precise, exact, determinate, definite, additive, linear, independent ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3353637
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1851452.htmlThu, 19 Dec 2019 11:42:31 GMTREVISION: The Role of the Virtue of Prudence in a Racing Competition and in an Economic Competition in the Market Place: Prudence Is the First and Only Virtue Applied in Both SituationsJust as there is a division of labor and specialization of function in the economic realm, the application of the different virtues also is divided up and specialized in actual application.<br><br>Adam Smith’s example of running a race emphasized the fact that, when preparing and training and running the race, the only virtue that could be applied was the virtue of prudence. It is simply impossible to train for and run a race to win if the racer is considering the interests of the other competitors in the race besides his own. In fact, it is an oxymoron to argue that the racer needs to be simultaneously concerned about how he finishes the race and how others may finish the race. It is only after he has finished the race and won(lost) that the virtues of temperance, justice (fairness), benevolence and magnanimity can come into play. So it is also in the economic competition in the market place. It is the virtue of prudence that is especially applicable in the economic competition in ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3429493
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1851451.htmlThu, 19 Dec 2019 11:40:29 GMTNew: On the Conflict Between Kahn’s 1936 Reply to Neisser, That ‘My Own Ideas Were Largely Derived From Mr. Keynes’, and Kahn’s Critical Assessment of Keynes’s Math Skills in R. Skidelsky (1992)The claim made to Robert Skidelsky by Richard Kahn, published in Skidelsky’s 1992 second volume of his autobiography of Keynes, that “…he recalled Keynes himself as being a poor mathematician by 1927…”, is in direct conflict with Kahn’s 1936 reply to Neisser, that "My own ideas were largely derived from Mr. Keynes.” An examination of the mathematical analysis on page 183 of Kahn’s June, 1931, Economic Journal article on the employment multiplier shows that the mathematical style in Kahn’s article is identical to Keynes’s mathematical style of stating the problem and then giving the final result, but in which none of the intermediate steps in the mathematical analysis are provided. <br><br>Kahn’s answer on page 183 of his article in 1931, which was the result of finding the finite limiting value of a geometrical, declining, infinite series of numbers, is identical to the answer presented by Keynes on page 315 in footnote 1 in chapter 26 of Keynes’s 1921 A Treatise on Probability ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3496119
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1850861.htmlTue, 17 Dec 2019 14:11:36 GMTNew: On the Need for an Extensive Revision of the ‘Imprecise Probabilities’ Entry regarding Boole and Keynes in
<i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> (Spring, 2019 Edition) in the ‘ Supplement to Imprecise Probabilities-Historical appendix: Theories of Imprecise Belief.’The "Supplement to Imprecise Probabilities-Historical appendix: Theories of imprecise belief " presents a severely inaccurate representation of Keynes’s contributions to imprecise probability. It also completely ignores the seminal, path breaking contributions to imprecise probability made by George Boole in his 1854 The Laws of Thought in chapters 16-21. The error is compounded with regard to Keynes because Keynes’s entire system of logical probability in the A Treatise on Probability is built on Boole’s exposition of lower (greatest lower bound)-upper (least upper bound) probabilities that Keynes used in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability to develop his method of inexact measurement and approximation using interval valued probability.<br><br>It is in chapter 15 of the TP on pp. 161-163, as well as in chapter 16, 17, 20 and 22 of the TP, in a very detailed, mathematical analysis of his earlier, brief, graphical exposition in chapter III of the TP, that an analysis of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3495817
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1850790.htmlTue, 17 Dec 2019 11:45:14 GMTREVISION: On the Impossibility of Adam Smith Being an Advocate/Apologist of Laissez Faire and the Invisible Hand: Smith Recognized the Dangers of the Upper Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors and Their Connection to Financial Crises as Pointed Out by Gavin KennedyGavin Kennedy expended a great amount of energy and time over a period of many years trying to get economists to actually read what Smith had written in its entirety through his books ,academic articles and Blog, titled Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy. Kennedy’s reasoning is impeccable. If economists were to actually read what Smith had actually written in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (6th ed.,1790) and The Wealth of Nations (1776) completely, then they would no longer be misled by numerous works claiming that Adam Smith was an advocate of Laissez Faire and a believer in the Invisible Hand. These claims were based on small parts of both books, taken out of context, that ignored major parts of Smith’s analysis, such as Smith’s analysis of the negative impact on the macro economy of a segment of the Upper Income class Smith called “prodigals, imprudent risk takers, and projectors".<br><br>Kennedy would be greatly shocked to find a paper published by a M. Zafirovski ,appearing in the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3482315
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1849762.htmlFri, 13 Dec 2019 14:30:20 GMTNew: On the Erroneous Heterodox and Post Keynesian Belief That Keynes’s Interval Valued Decision Theory in the A Treatise on Probability (1921) Was an Ordinal Theory of ProbabilityKeynes’s initial, introductory presentation of his inexact measurement, approximation approach to interval valued probability occurred on pages 38-40 of chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability. Keynes used a simple diagram on page 38 to illustrate the non linear and non additive nature of interval valued probability. He also informed the reader on pages 37-38 that the introductory analysis on pp.38-40 would be a brief analysis whereas the analysis in Part II would be a detailed analysis. Post Keynesian, Institutionalist and heterodix economists have completely ignored Keynes’s warning and completely misinterpreted and misrepresented Keynes’s introductory analysis on interval valued probability as an ordinal theory of probability.<br><br>The result of this misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Keynes’s decision theory can be seen in the response of public officials, who have been exposed to the misinterpretations and misrepresentations of heterodox economists, when they are ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3492506
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1848941.htmlWed, 11 Dec 2019 13:12:41 GMTNew: Why Didn’t P. Oslington’s Invisible Hand (the ‘Providential Hand of God’) Prevent the Destruction of the Scottish Macro Economy by the Projectors, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Prodigals in 1772 after the Ayr Bank Collapse?P. Oslington’s (2012) Invisible Hand (the ”providential hand of God”) is viewed by him as the providential hand of God, who is watching over the macro economy of Scotland to make sure that nothing evil befalls the Scottish economy. The problem is that Oslington is completely oblivious to the collapse of the Ayr bank in 1772, which resulted from massive financial speculation in land engaged in by British East India Company connected borrowers whose bubble collapsed in 1772, ushering in a four year depression in Scotland and a worldwide recession.<br><br>Oslington never mentions the national and international, coercive economic power of the British East India Company, which dominated the English economy for well over 200 years. Oslington never mentions Smith’s great concerns about the very negative economic impacts on society as a whole of the prodigals, imprudent risk takers, and projectors that Smith discussed extensively on pages 279-341 of the Modern Library (Canaan) edition of the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3491066
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1848206.htmlSun, 08 Dec 2019 18:48:11 GMTNew: On the Unfortunate Ignorance of Academics regarding the Technical and Mathematical Tools for Dealing with Uncertainty Developed by J M Keynes in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 and in His Earlier Fellowship Dissertations in 1907 and 1908: Interval Valued Probability, Decision Weights, and Safety First AnalysisKeynes developed a number of technical, mathematical tools for dealing with the problems of uncertainty (ambiguity, vagueness, indeterminate probabilities, imprecise probabilities) in his A Treatise on Probability in 1921 (and in his earlier Fellowship Dissertations of 1907 and 1908) that continue to be overlooked by practically all academics in the nearly 100 years since its publication in 1921. Keynes’s technical and mathematical modeling developments took place in chapters 15-17 of Part II of the A Treatise on Probability, chapters 20 and 22 of Part III of the A Treatise on Probability, Chapter 26 of Part IV of the A Treatise on Probability, and chapters 29 and 30 of Part V of the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Part II of the A Treatise on Probability included Keynes’s original work dealing with non –additive probabilities that was based on the original work of George Boole in his 1854 The Laws of Thought. Keynes’s Boolean upper and lower bounded probabilities, which Keynes ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3490263
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1847404.htmlThu, 05 Dec 2019 21:26:44 GMTNew: On Keynes’s August 27th and 30th, 1935 Exchanges with Harrod, Who Acknowledged That Keynes Had Discovered the Missing LM Equation Needed to Complete the Classical –Neo Classical Theory of the Rate of Interest: The Ignorance of This Exchange, in Volume 13 of the CWJMK, Explains Why Economists, Who Have Written on Keynes, Have Overlooked His IS-LM MoEconomists who have been writing on Keynes’s General Theory since 1936 have been unable to understand, grasp or comprehend Keynes’s clear statements in chapter 21 of the General Theory that ”… if we have all the facts before us, we shall have enough simultaneous equations to give us a determinate result” on p.299 of the General Theory and/or Keynes’s statement that “the quantitative effect could be derived from the three elements” on page 298 of the General Theory. <br><br>This failure to grasp that Keynes is analyzing his IS-LM(LP) model in chapter 21,as he said he would do in greater detail than he did in section 4 of Chapter 15 in a footnote on page 209, has led to the false conclusion for the last 81 years that there was no IS-LM(LP) analysis provided by Keynes in the General Theory, when, in fact, this analysis, which is central to the entire General Theory, is provided in explicit fashion.<br><br>The question of why no economist in the 20th or 21st century ,who has written on ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3486011
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1844555.htmlMon, 25 Nov 2019 13:43:19 GMTREVISION: On the Impossibility of Adam Smith Being an Advocate/Apologist of Laissez Faire and the Invisible Hand: Smith Recognized the Dangers of the Upper Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors and Their Connection to Financial Crises Pointed Out by Gavin KennedyGavin Kennedy expended a great amount of energy and time over a period of many years trying to get economists to actually read what Smith had written in its entirety through his books ,academic articles and Blog, titled Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy. Kennedy’s reasoning is impeccable .If economists were to actually read what Smith had actually written in The Theory of Moral Sentiments(6th ed.,1790) and The Wealth of Nations(1776) completely, then they would no longer be misled by numerous works claiming that Adam Smith was an advocate of Laissez Faire and a believer in the Invisible Hand.These claims were based on small parts of both books, taken out of context, that ignored major parts of Smith’s analysis, such as Smith’s analysis of the negative impact on the macro economy of a segment of the Upper Income class Smith called “prodigals, imprudent risk takers, and projectors “.<br><br>Kennedy would be greatly shocked to find a paper published by a M. Zafirovski ,appearing in the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3482315
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1842242.htmlFri, 15 Nov 2019 16:12:09 GMTNew: J. M Keynes Was Never a ‘Chapter 12’ Keynesian: The Claim That He Was a ‘Chapter 12’ Keynesian Was Manufactured by Joan Robinson and G. L. S. Shackle After His Death by Changing Keynes’s Definition of Uncertainty to Radical UncertaintyThe claim that Keynes regarded himself as a “Chapter 12" Keynesian is inaccurate and misleading. Keynes’s chapter 12 discussion and definition of uncertainty in the General Theory is simply a footnote to his much more general theoretical discussion about uncertainty made in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 pages 309-312 which concentrated on economics specifically. This was demonstrated in the 1937-38 Keynes-Townshend correspondence, where there is no discussion of the 1937 QJE article or radical uncertainty. <br><br> Keynes had two interrelated and interconnected models in the General Theory. They were the D-Z model, which dealt with expected aggregate demand, D, and the IS-LM(LP) model, which dealt with actual or realized aggregate demand, Y. Keynes incorporated uncertainty and expectations into his D-Z model of chapters 20 and 21 after having provided readers of the General Theory with a very brief introduction to the Theory of Effective Demand in Chapter 3 of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3479891
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1842112.htmlFri, 15 Nov 2019 12:58:16 GMTNew: On Pigou’s 1950 Reassessment of Keynes’s General Theory: Correct Conclusion, but All of the Premises Are Completely WrongPigou’s 1950 reassessment of the major contribution made by Keynes’s General Theory is surprisingly accurate. Unfortunately, none of the supporting materials ha cites from the General Theory to buttress and support his conclusion is correct. Pigou’s main support for his conclusion comes from a reliance on chapters 13,18,and 23,with pages 246-247 of chapter 18 and pages 167-171 of chapter 13 serving as the major sources supporting his conclusion. The only correct foundation for Pigou’s reassessment consists of the appendix to chapter 19, where Keynes demonstrated to Pigou that he had no IS-LM model to determine the rate of interest and hence no way of dealing with the amount of investment or investment multiplier. Pigou also failed to grasp Keynes's chapter 20 and chapter 21, section Four, which contains Keynes’s formal analysis of his IS-LM model on pages 298-299, followed by Keynes’s own critique of his model on pp. 300-303 and his mathematical extension on pages 304-306 that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3477664
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1840460.htmlMon, 11 Nov 2019 10:30:23 GMTREVISION: J.M. Keynes’s Criticisms, on Pages 275–276 and 297–298 of the General Theory, of the Marshallian, Neoclassical, Mathematical Approach to Partial Equilibrium (Ceteris Paribus) Analysis, Where Functions Have Only One Independent Variable Only: Keynes’s Application of Systems of Simultaneous Equations in the General Theory in Chapter 15 and the AppendJ.M. Keynes’s criticisms of the Marshallian, partial equilibrium (ceteris paribus) approach to mathematical modeling in the General Theory on pages 275- 276 and 297-298, where the mathematical modeling relies on functions with only one independent variable, has been completely misinterpreted by all macroeconomists for the 82 years as an attack on mathematical economics or formal analysis, in general. It is nothing of the sort. Given Keynes’s appreciation for the formal, mathematical work done of Frank Ramsey in 1927 and 1928 and by William Ernest Johnson in 1913 in a paper in the Economic Journal on mathematical methods in microeconomics, as well as Keynes appreciation of Ramsey’s betting quotients approach in 1930 as providing a stronger logical foundation for numerical probability, there is no objective support for the claims, made by Joan Robinson and many, many others, that Keynes was a partial equilibrium, Marshallian theorist, who would work only with mathematical functions ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3197465
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1838858.htmlTue, 05 Nov 2019 14:14:32 GMTREVISION: The Virtues of Prudence and Self-Command, not Jeremy Bentham’s Max U or the Invisible Hand of the Market, are Adam Smith’s Foundation for the Wealth of NationsThe Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; 1790) is the foundation for the Wealth of Nations(1776).Smith recognized, like all other major spiritual and moral teachers, that Prudence is the most important virtue because nothing can be accomplished without it being applied successfully first. The virtue of Prudence applies in all facets of life. However, there were individual philosophers who rejected virtue ethics. One such individual was Jeremy Bentham (another was Karl Marx). Bentham sought to replace Smith’s Virtue Ethics with his Principle of Maximizing Utility. Bentham argued that only his principle of maximizing utility could support the study of ethics.<br><br>Bentham attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach in 1787 in the same fashion as J.Viner attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics in 1927.<br><br>Both Bentham and Viner argued that <br>• Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (virtue ethics) is very flawed <br>• Smith’s support of interest rate control laws and skewing of bank credit ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3438898
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1838159.htmlSat, 02 Nov 2019 08:52:16 GMTNew: Keynes Had No ‘Hidden Method’ in the A Treatise on Probability (1921): Keynes's Method Is an Explicit Inductive Logic Built on Inexact Measurement and Approximation, Which Was Openly Based on Boole’s Non Linear, Non Additive Approach Using Interval Values ProbabilityJ M Keynes’s method was explicitly introduced and used in the A Treatise on Probability in Parts II, III and V. Keynes’s method is an inductive logic built on the mathematical logic and algebra of George Boole. Boole introduced non linearity and non additivity into his approach using interval valued probability that used lower and upper bounds. Boole’s approach, like Keynes’s, deals explicitly with problems like non comparability, non measurability and incommensurability that can’t be dealt with by additive and linear probability representations. Keynes initially introduced a brief discussion of these problems in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability and Chapter 4 of the General Theory.<br><br>Keynes called this method inexact measurement and approximation in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability. It is impossible for Keynes to be anti-mathematical,anti-formalist, anti logicist, or a rationalist, given that, building on Boole, he created an inductive logic. Rationalists, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3474080
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1837881.htmlThu, 31 Oct 2019 21:35:43 GMTNew: An Examination of P. Davidson’s Misunderstandings about the Limiting Frequency Theory of Probability, Ergodicity and Non Ergodicity: These Approaches Require that either the Number of Observations Approaches Infinity or Time Approaches Infinity in Order for the Limit to ExistPaul Davidson’s technical understanding of the mathematical details of the Limiting Frequency theory of probability and Kolmogorov’s measure theoretic extension from additivity to countable additivity, which allows for an extension of the concept of the Law of Large Numbers to the concept or ergodicity and non ergodicity, where time is substituted for observations, is extremely poor.<br><br>Davidson has repeatedly made errors in many journal articles published in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics and books published by Edward Elgar about these concepts since 1979. For instance, one example of a fundamental error made by Davidson since 1982 is his assertion, contradicted by all mathematical statisticians, that “Non stationarity is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for nonergodicity”. Davidson has repeated this false claim many times in the literature since 1982 when it first appeared in an article published in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. It is very simple ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3471024
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1836214.htmlFri, 25 Oct 2019 13:32:46 GMTNew: An Examination of the Very Severe Ignorance of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability Among Heterodox Economists and Their Erroneous Beliefs About Logical and Subjective ProbabilityHeterodox economists have simply skipped the two most important parts of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921),Part II and Part V. They basically assess Keynes’s position on probability and uncertainty based on a reading primarily of Chapter III of Part I of the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>This results in their failure to grasp Keynes’s inexact measurement – approximation approach to probability in Part II and Keynes’s inexact measurement – approximation approach to statistics in Part V of the TP. Both Part II and V form the basic foundation of Keynes’s approach to logical probability that Keynes built on Boole. <br><br>Specifically, heterodox economists are ignorant of (i) Keynes’s inexact approach to measurement, based on Boolean approximation that uses lower and upper bounds, when dealing with probability and (ii) Keynes’s inexact approach to measurement ,based on Boolean approximation that uses lower and upper bounds, when dealing with statistics.<br><br>This results in ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3467399
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1834726.htmlMon, 21 Oct 2019 10:59:00 GMTNew: Keynes’s Method Has Nothing to Do With a Common Discourse or Ordinary Language Logic: Keynes’s Method, Which Involved the Use of Inexact Measurement in Probability and Statistics, Based on Approximation, Was Based Directly on Boole’s Mathematical Logic and AlgebraIt is impossible to correctly grasp Keynes’s method of analysis in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 if the work of G Boole is ignored. Unfortunately, all Post Keynesian, Institutionalist and Heterodox economists , who have published work on Keynes in the 20th and 21st centuries, have done just that. George Boole, and not J M Keynes in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability, put forth the first technically advanced mathematical and logical treatment of a logical theory of probability in 1854 in his The Laws of Thought that was based on a logic of propositions about events or outcomes and not the events or outcomes themselves. This logic is a mathematical logic and has absolutely nothing to do with an ordinary discourse human logic, which involves the use of a common sense language between humans.<br><br>Given that Keynes built his A Treatise on Probability directly on the mathematical and logical approach and foundation of G Boole’s Boolean algebra and logic, it is simply impossible ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3466532
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1834181.htmlFri, 18 Oct 2019 09:27:05 GMTNew: Keynes Demonstrated in Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability That His Non Numerical Probabilities Are Identical to Boole’s Constituent Probabilities: It Is Mathematically Impossible for Keynes’s Non Numerical Probabilities to Be Ordinal ProbabilitiesThe claim that Keynes’s non numerical probabilities are ordinal probabilities was shown to be mathematically impossible by Keynes in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability on pp.162-163 and in chapter 17 on pp.186-194.<br><br>Keynes’s non numerical probabilities are identical to Boole’s constituent probabilities. Keynes improved on Boole’s technique and was able to solve Boolean problems much quicker than it took Boole to solve the problems. Part II of the A Treatise on Probability is nearly identical to the analysis provided in his two Cambridge University Fellowships in 1907 and 1908.<br><br><br>
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3457973
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1829827.htmlWed, 02 Oct 2019 15:52:24 GMTNew: The Foundation for Keynes’s Decision Theoretic Approach to Uncertainty in the General Theory (1936) and the 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics Reply Article Was Acknowledged by Keynes to Be Based on His General Theory of Decision Making Presented in the A Treatise on Probability (1921) in the 1937–38 Correspondence with H. TownshendKeynes made it clear to Townshend in their 1937-38 exchanges that Townshend’s assessment, that Keynes ‘s theory of liquidity preference in the General Theory was based on Keynes’s non numerical probabilities and weight of evidence(argument)analysis from the A Treatise on Probability, was correct. No mention at all is made about Frank Ramsey and subjective probability. No mention at all is made about the 1937 QJE article. No mention at all is made by either Townshend or Keynes about fundamental (irreducible, deep, radical, genuine, etc.) uncertainty. What is mentioned explicitly by Keynes to Townshend is the importance of Keynes’s comments on pages 148 and 240 of the General Theory. <br><br>There is absolutely no support for any heterodox and/or Post Keynesian claim, based on a number of assessments made by Joan Robinson and G L S Shackle over their lifetimes, that the 1937 QJE article represents a major or fundamental change in Keynes’s view about uncertainty from those expressed in ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3457966
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1829825.htmlWed, 02 Oct 2019 15:46:23 GMTNew: Keynes’s Logical, Objective, Relation of Probability, P(a/H)=α, Where α Is a Degree of Rational Belief, Has Nothing to Do With Truth: Both Orthodox and Heterodox Economists Fail to Realize That There Is No Such Thing as a True Probability, True Expectation, Or True Expected ValueKeynes’s logical, objective, relation of probability, P(a/h)=α,where α is a degree of rational belief, has nothing to do with truth or falsehood. Probability is not truth. The belief that a probability, expectation or expected values can be true (false) appears to involve the same kind of error pointed out by George Box regarding statistical models, that “all models are wrong, but some are useful.” Orthodox rational expectation theorists appear to believe that there are true rational expected values, true statistical models and true, objective probabilities, which rational decision makers can know.There is no support in any theory of probability for such beliefs. Heterodox economists are no better and make the same error.<br><br>Keynes, in his conclusion to chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability, pointed this out and emphasized that rational decision making has nothing to do with the truth. Probability has nothing to do with the truth. The idea that there are true objective ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3449906
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1827768.htmlWed, 25 Sep 2019 16:28:21 GMTNew: Keynes’s Canonical Statements on Uncertainty Appear in His 1921 a Treatise on Probability in Chapter 26 on Pages 309 -312: Statements about Uncertainty in the General Theory in 1936 and the 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics Article Are, at Best, Very Small Footnotes to Chapter 26 of the A Treatise on ProbabilityThe Townshend –Keynes exchanges over decision making, weight of the argument (evidence), non numerical probabilities (Keynes’s term for Boole’s constituent probabilities, used in The Laws of Thought in 1854, that appears on page 163 of the A Treatise on Probability in chapter 15 on inexact measurement and approximation), and the connection between the A Treatise on Probability, the General Theory,and the 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics, reveal that Keynes’s discussions about uncertainty in the General Theory, and the 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article are simply small ,minor footnotes to the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Nowhere in the exchanges between Keynes and Townshend in 1937 and 1938 does either Keynes or Townshend mention or make any reference to the 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article, which Joan Robinson, G L S Shackle, Paul Davidson, and Post Keynesian and heterodox economists claim marked a major change in Keynes’s approach to decision ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3453602
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1827092.htmlMon, 23 Sep 2019 20:43:53 GMTNew: On the Failure of Economists to Grasp the Difference between the Calculus (Instantaneous Change) Model Used by Keynes in the General Theory to Define the Mathematical Theory of the Multiplier in His Model and the Actual Dynamic or Process Multiplier that Occurs in Historical Time That Was Not in His ModelThe mathematical(logical), technical, theoretical exposition of the multiplier given in chapter 10 of the General Theory by Keynes is identical to the exposition given by Keynes in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in footnote 1 on page 315. The mathematical theory requires that the limit be taken of an infinite, declining, geometric series of numbers. This instantaneous multiplier result, which is derived by an application of the differential calculus, has nothing to do with a dynamic multiplier or of any type of actual, period analysis or income spending process occurring in actual or historical time.<br><br>The confusion among economists since 1936 stems from economists taking seriously the claims made by two mathematically illiterate, confused, and inept economists, Joan Robinson and Dennis Robertson, who had no idea about how to use simple algebra, much less differential calculus, in an economic application.<br><br>This confusion between a theoretical, mathematical, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3443985
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1821031.htmlWed, 04 Sep 2019 16:36:09 GMTNew: Keynes Always Adhered to His Logical, Objective Probability Relation, Defined As P(a/H) Equals a Rational Degree of Belief, α: Logical Probability Always Remained the Guide to Life for J M KeynesKeynes’s 1931 acknowledgement, that Ramsey’s theory of subjective degree of belief, based on numerically precise probability, was acceptable to him in the special case where w=1, has been constantly misinterpreted. This misinterpretation follows from the lack of understanding of Keynes's weight of the argument relation. This required that Keynes’s second logical relation of the A Treatise on Probability, the evidential weight of the argument, V(a/H)=w,0≤w≤1, where w=K/(K+I) and K defined the amount of relevant knowledge and I defined the amount of relevant ignorance, was defined and explicitly taken into account. It has been completely overlooked by all commentators that Keynes also stated in the same comment in 1931 that Ramsey’s theory did not deal with Keynes’s rational degrees of belief, P(a/h)=α,where 0≤α≤1. Only in the special case where w=1 does Keynes accept Ramsey’s approach because then the lower probability also equals the upper probability, which means that you now have ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3442033
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1819403.htmlWed, 28 Aug 2019 13:51:54 GMTREVISION: The Virtues of Prudence and Self-Command, not Jeremy Bentham’s Max U or the Invisible Hand of the Market, is Adam Smith’s Foundation for the Wealth of NationsThe Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; 1790) is the foundation for the Wealth of Nations(1776).Smith recognized, like all other major spiritual and moral teachers, that Prudence is the most important virtue because nothing can be accomplished without it being applied successfully first. The virtue of Prudence applies in all facets of life. However, there were individual philosophers who rejected virtue ethics. One such individual was Jeremy Bentham (another was Karl Marx). Bentham sought to replace Smith’s Virtue Ethics with his Principle of Maximizing Utility. Bentham argued that only his principle of maximizing utility could support the study of ethics.<br><br>Bentham attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach in 1787 in the same fashion as J.Viner attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics in 1927.<br><br>Both Bentham and Viner argued that <br>• Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (virtue ethics) is very flawed <br>• Smith’s support of interest rate control laws and skewing of bank credit ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3438898
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1817228.htmlWed, 21 Aug 2019 11:26:01 GMTNew: How Should the Post Keynesian School Define ‘Uncertainty’? 1 The Only Correct Answer Is to Use Keynes’s Own Definition Given in Footnote 1 on Page 148 of Chapter 12 of the General Theory: Uncertainty Is an Inverse Function of the Weight of the ArgumentThe Post Keynesian, Institutionalist and Heterodox schools of economics have failed for 83 years to discern the definition of uncertainty given by Keynes in footnote 1 on page 148 of the General Theory that was repeated on page 240 of the General Theory.<br><br>The footnotes on page 148 and 240 of the General Theory are the foundation for Townshend’s summary of the 1937-1938 Keynes-Townshend correspondence, which was that Keynes’s non numerical (interval valued) probabilities and weight of the evidence (argument) from the A Treatise on Probability were the foundation for Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest in the General Theory. Keynes’s reply to Townshend was that there was very little of Townshend’s summary from which he would differ and that Keynes’s theory (“…my theory…”) was the theory presented in the A Treatise on Probability. <br><br>Nowhere in the 1937-38 exchanges between Keynes and Townshend is there any mention of F.Ramsey’s objections to Keynes ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3438090
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1816766.htmlMon, 19 Aug 2019 15:37:16 GMTNew: How Would J M Keynes Have Responded to Shackle’s 1949 ‘Probability and Uncertainty’ Paper?: Keynes Would Have Required That the Paper Must Be Revised Before PublicationJ M Keynes, in a letter to Joan Robinson on November 9th,1936, responded to the utter mess that Joan Robinson had made of his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest in the General Theory by stating: <br> <br>“Dear Joan, I beg you not to publish. For your argument, as it stands is most certainly nonsense.”<br>Robinson eventually cut out all of the material, that Keynes had described as nonsense, that dealt with Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest before it was published in book form in 1937.<br> <br>In 1949, Shackle published a paper that is in the same category as Joan Robinson’s paper that was very severely criticized by Keynes in his letter to her of November 9th, 1936. Shackle’s “Probability and Uncertainty”, which he republished uncorrected in 1955 in his book Uncertainty in Economics, demonstrates that Shackle simply did not understand that his entire understanding of probability and decision making was based on the antinomian ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3431529
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1813401.htmlWed, 07 Aug 2019 12:59:39 GMTREVISION: The Role of the Virtue of Prudence in a Racing Competition and in an Economic Competition in the Market Place: Prudence Is the First and Only Virtue Applied in Both SituationsJust as there is a division of labor and specialization of function in the economic realm, the application of the different virtues also is divided up and specialized in actual application.<br><br>Adam Smith’s example of running a race emphasized the fact that, when preparing and training and running the race, the only virtue that could be applied was the virtue of prudence. It is simply impossible to train for and run a race to win if the racer is considering the interests of the other competitors in the race besides his own. In fact, it is an oxymoron to argue that the racer needs to be simultaneously concerned about how he finishes the race and how others may finish the race. It is only after he has finished the race and won(lost) that the virtues of temperance, justice (fairness), benevolence and magnanimity can come into play. So it is also in the economic competition in the market place. It is the virtue of prudence that is especially applicable in the economic competition in ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3429493
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1812306.htmlSat, 03 Aug 2019 21:43:56 GMTNew: Adam Smith’s Very Brief Mention and Discussion of the Invisible Hand, In His
<i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i> and
<i>The Wealth of Nations</i>, Was Not Intended to Provide Any Theoretical Foundation for Any of His Analysis: Smith Regarded the Invisible Hand as an Unimportant
<i>Obiter Dicta</i> Used for Metaphorical Purposes OnlyAdam Smith’s <i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i> (1759) provided a general analysis of virtue ethics (prudence, temperance, courage, justice, benevolence, where Smith combined the virtues of temperance and courage into the virtue of self command) that was applied to all areas of a human society -the political, ethical, economic, social, civic, and institutional. His <i>The Wealth of Nations</i> (1776) provided a specific analysis that concentrated on the one virtue that primarily applied in the economic realm, the virtue of prudence. It is in the market place where this all important virtue manifests itself.The connection between Smith’s two books is very similar to the connection between Keynes’s <i>A Treatise on Probability </i>(1921), a book that provided a general theory of decision making that applied to all aspects of society, and his General Theory (1936), which applied his general theory of decision making to one specific area, the area of macroeconomics, which was the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3427639
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1812270.htmlSat, 03 Aug 2019 11:33:52 GMTREVISION: An Examination of Some Possible Explanations for the Existence of the ‘Mystery’ Concerning the Only Diagram in the A Treatise on Probability on Page 39 (Page 42 of the 1973 CWJMK Edition)Professor Yasuhiro Sakai’s important 2016 contribution concerning the nature of Keynes’s contribution in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability summarized the general academic view that there was a great mystery about the nature of Keynes’s illustration, about his non-numerical probabilities in his diagram on page 39 in chapter III of A Treatise on Probability, concerning the operational capabilities of Keynes’s analysis of probability.<br><br>In fact, Keynes had made it very clear on pp.37-38 of chapter III of A Treatise on Probability that a "detailed" analysis would be presented only in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. What he presented in the diagram on page 39 was only a “brief” summary of conclusions that would be supported in a technical manner in Part II. The particular chapter that incorporates Keynes technical, detailed analysis was chapter XV of the A Treatise on Probability. Keynes explains exactly what his system of analysis involves on pp.159-160 and then provides ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3349928
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1810726.htmlMon, 29 Jul 2019 11:34:00 GMT