SSRN Author: Sergei IzmalkovSergei Izmalkov SSRN Content
http://www.ssrn.com/author=282868
http://www.ssrn.com/rss/en-usWed, 03 Feb 2016 04:06:33 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Wed, 03 Feb 2016 04:06:33 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: Informed Seller in a Hotelling MarketWe derive the optimal selling mechanism for a monopolist who is privately informed about the attributes of a horizontally differentiated good. To do so, we set up an informed principal problem in a Hotelling model where the buyer's preferences are described in terms of a base consumption value and the distance between the buyer's and the seller's locations. To represent different kinds of markets we consider linear, concave, and convex distance costs. We derive the optimal mechanism and offer ways to implement it. For instance, for low (high) base consumption values, it is optimal for the seller to disclose (do not disclose) her type and then set the optimal price. For intermediate values, the optimal mechanism may involve stochastic delivery and can be implemented by multi-item menus that involve selling information or refund options. Under linear distance costs, offering the following two-item menu is optimal: a good with undisclosed attributes (opaque good) or an option to learn ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2398258
http://www.ssrn.com/1466658.htmlTue, 02 Feb 2016 18:31:41 GMTNew: The Market for Surprises: Selling Substitute Goods Through LotteriesIn this paper we solve the revenue maximization problem of multi-product monopolist when the products are substitutes. We consider a Hotelling model with two horizontally differentiated goods located at the endpoints of the segment. Consumers are located uniformly on the segment, their valuations for each good are equal to base consumption value minus distance costs. We consider different specifications for the distance cost function: linear, concave, and convex. When base consumption value is high, the seller maximizes her expected profit by offering a menu of base and opaque goods. A continuum of type-specific opaque goods is optimal under convex costs, whereas a single half-half lottery over base goods is optimal under concave and linear costs. When base consumption value is low, only base goods are sold. Finally, when base-consumption value is intermediate, the optimal mechanism may entail the offering of lotteries with positive probability of no delivery. Our findings can ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2690566
http://www.ssrn.com/1444945.htmlSun, 15 Nov 2015 14:01:08 GMTREVISION: Informed Seller in a Hotelling MarketWe derive the optimal selling mechanism for a monopolist who is privately informed about the attributes of a horizontally differentiated good. To do so, we set up and solve an informed principal problem in a Hotelling model where the buyer's preferences are described in terms of a base consumption value and the distance between the buyer's ideal and the seller's actual locations. Unlike full disclosure results in vertically differentiated settings, in our environment the seller can gain by keeping her information private. To describe the optimal solution we introduce the concept of allocation sensitivity to seller's information- a measure of how buyer types' allocations depend on the seller's type realization. We show that when the base consumption value is low, each seller's type allocates the good only to nearby buyer types: the optimal mechanism is fully sensitive. When the base consumption value is high, all buyer types buy from all seller types: the optimal mechanism is fully ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2398258
http://www.ssrn.com/1372814.htmlWed, 11 Feb 2015 10:59:46 GMT