CALL FOR PAPERS
     
        THE SHIFTING CAPITAL MARKETS & CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
                   CONFERENCE AND RESEARCH AGENDA
     
     
     The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and 
     Performance at the Yale School of Management is requesting 
     proposals for research exploring the relationship between 
     the evolution of capital markets and corporate governance.  
     Submissions are encouraged from all academic disciplines 
     including but not limited to accounting, economics, 
     finance, law, organizational behavior, and political 
     science. Selected authors will participate in a conference 
     scheduled for November 2008.
     
     
     PROJECT OVERVIEW:
     
     Economies rely on the corporation as the engine for 
     economic growth - to create jobs, earn profits, and divide 
     the value added among those contributing to its prosperity.  
     Capital markets make this possible by providing the 
     corporation with:
     
     1.  sources of financing in the form of equity, debt or 
         other instruments;
     2.  a range of financial services; 
     3.  engaged potential business partners.
     
     Today's capital markets have evolved from the dispersed 
     ownership model underlying regulatory and corporate 
     governance theory and practice for the last 75 years 
     (particularly in the United States).
     
     Intermediaries such as pension funds, mutual funds, 
     insurance companies, banks and sovereign wealth funds are 
     dominant players in the global capital markets, often 
     taking seats in the boardroom and acting on behalf of 
     shareholders. These institutions themselves entrust huge 
     amounts of money to other intermediaries, such as private 
     equity funds, hedge funds, activist funds, and now 
     publicly-held equity funds. These developments have been 
     both hailed and vilified for their effects on corporate 
     governance.
     
     "The Shifting Capital Market & Corporate Performance"
     project aims to unravel the connection between ownership, 
     governance and the corporation's ability to meet the 
     expectations of shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
     creditors, customers, communities, and society at large.  
     Empirical study is a prudent undertaking before regulatory 
     or private initiatives are implemented in defense of the 
     vibrancy and innovativeness of capital markets.  
     
     This project complements current OECD efforts focused on 
     the relationship between capital markets and general 
     economic development. This study will provide the OECD 
     with insights into the evolution of capital markets and 
     corporate governance and suggest how to ensure that capital 
     markets continue to fuel corporate performance.
     
     
     TOPICS OF RESEARCH:
     
     The Millstein Center is encouraging new research that fits 
     into three broad themes. The questions listed below 
     suggest topics we hope to see addressed. Of course, 
     research proposals are likely to be more focused. We 
     welcome investigations of related questions as well: 
     
     The Current State and Evolution of Capital Markets
     - How do ownership patterns vary over time and from market 
       to market? How can we account for this variation?
     - Do present ownership structures and corporate governance 
       practices clash with the concepts of dispersed ownership 
       and managerial capitalism? Any ramifications?
     - Are private equity funds displacing the public capital 
       market? Is the emergence of such funds stimulated by the 
       shortcomings of public capital markets, the burden of 
       regulatory compliance, or some other force?  
     
     Behavioral Drivers of Capital Market Participants
     - What are the incentives that drive capital into the new 
       investment and ownership structures? Has private 
       ownership become more attractive to boards, managers, and 
       shareholders?
     - How are new constituencies in the markets influencing 
       corporate managers' decision making, as compared to 
       directors, politicians, regulators, stock exchanges, 
       media, and analysts? 
     - Do director's fiduciary responsibilities conflict with 
       financial considerations in the context of decisions 
       regarding change in ownership and control?
     
     Implications of Capital Market Developments
     - Do changes in ownership models serve the best interests 
       of individual investors or intermediaries (or both)? Are 
       the current mechanisms of investor protection appropriate 
       for the new forms of investment and ownership?
     - Has the evolution of capital markets and ownership 
       structures had unintended negative (or positive) 
       consequences for corporate performance and distribution 
       of capital?
     - Does the emergence of new investors - including private 
       equity funds - help fix the problem of "short-termism" or 
       exacerbate it?
     - Do private equity funds improve corporate performance by 
       methods applicable to public corporations? Are these 
       gains sustainable in the long-term? Are performance 
       improvements a cause or consequence of better governance?  
     
     What happens when the company goes public once again?  
     - Are there circumstances when the incentives and 
       strategies of private pools of capital are systematically 
       out of line with efficient allocation of capital in 
       society?  Is this more or less true than it is for public 
       corporations?
     - Are the "transaction costs" associated with the capital 
       markets - fees and other costs attributed to fund 
       managers, investors, underwriters, lawyers, etc. - 
       proportional to the enhancement of liquidity, costs of 
       capital, and corporate performance?
     
     
     SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS:
     
     Scholars are invited to submit a detailed 4-5 page abstract 
     and outline of their proposed research project and paper by 
     February 4, 2008. Topics not specifically mentioned in 
     these pages that fit within the project parameters are 
     welcome. There is no submission fee.  
     
     A panel of Yale faculty members will select approximately 
     six papers for the Conference. Selected participants will 
     be notified by the mid-March 2008. Completed papers will 
     be expected by October 26, 2008. The conference is 
     tentatively scheduled for November 7-8, 2008.
     
     Conference organizers will pay for travel to the conference 
     and room and board in New Haven, CT for the selected 
     authors. The Center will provide a $2,500 research award 
     to the authors of all selected papers to support research 
     required to complete the paper to be presented at the 
     Conference and an award of $5,000 to the authors of the 
     best paper.
     
     If you wish to have your paper considered for presentation 
     at the conference, please submit your proposal 
     electronically, as a Word or PDF document. All identifying 
     information should be attached per separate cover page from 
     the abstract, via email to: 
     
     CONTACT:       Michele Grammatico
                    Administrator 
                    Millstein Center for Corporate Governance 
                      and Performance
                    Yale School of Management
     Email:         MAILTO:michele.grammatico@yale.edu 
     
     We look forward to an exciting conference and hope you will 
     submit your paper for consideration.  



Posted 12/16/07

Copyright © Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use