Call for Papers: Deterrence in Competition Policy

                             CALL FOR PAPERS

             THE 15TH WZB CONFERENCE ON MARKETS AND POLITICS
                                   AND
              THE 2ND CONFERENCE OF THE RESEARCH NETWORK ON
                INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY (RNIC)

                    DETERRENCE IN COMPETITION POLICY

                     October 17-18, 2008, in Berlin


      The WZB will stage its 15th conference on Markets and
      Politics on October 17-18, 2008, in Berlin. This will be
      held in conjunction with the 2nd conference of the Research
      Network on Innovation and Competition Policy (RNIC). During
      this conference, we intend to provide a forum for
      international researchers, practitioners and network
      members to present and discuss work concerning deterrence
      effects in competition policy. The objective is to organize
      a small-scale event that promotes interaction and
      discussion. Participation will mainly be by invitation.

      Deterrence is a crucial aspect of competition policy,
      traditionally in the area of cartels and price fixing, but
      also in the area of merger policy. Although its main
      elements - detection and punishment - are well known, an
      evaluation of the deterrence impact remains problematic.
      The major problem is its measurability, as it is difficult
      to assess how laws, court decisions and authority actions
      influence anti-competitive behavior by firms. This
      conference intends to enhance our understanding of
      deterrence in the area of competition policy, by discussing
      new methodological approaches for measurement. Furthermore,
      we also aim to consider both empirically and theoretically
      how new developments in competition policy may influence
      deterrence (e.g. the introduction of private litigation).
      Finally, deterrence, by changing firms' behavior, has then
      also an impact on resulting market structures and economic
      growth; these issues will be dealt with as well. Some of
      the issues we are interested in include:

      - The development of new empirical approaches
      - Do mistakes from authorities or uncertain environments
        influence deterrence?
      - Does over-deterrence exist?
      - The deterrence impact of plea bargaining on cartels
      - The deterrence impact of bargaining over remedies on
        mergers
      - Policing actual merger cases versus deterring future
        mergers
      - Does private litigation increase cartel deterrence?
      - Ex ante versus ex post deterrence
      - The importance of precedents and court decisions in
        deterrence
      - The deterrence impact on merger behavior and ultimately
        market structure and growth


      FURTHER INFORMATION:

      For further information, contact:

      CONTACT:       Jo Seldeslachts
      Email:         MAILTO:ioconf2008@wzb.eu


      ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:

      Jo Seldeslachts (WZB), Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University
      Berlin and WZB) and Lars-Hendrik Roller (WZB, ESMT and CEPR).


      PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE:

      If you would like to contribute a paper in one of these
      areas, please download and fill-out the reply form, save it
      to your computer, and send it back attached together with a
      pdf-file of your paper to:

      Email:         MAILTO:ioconf2008@wzb.eu

      Papers should be received by May 30, with a decision being
      made by August 1. Program participants will be reimbursed
      according to our guidelines. Further information can be
      found at the conference website:

      http://www.wzb.eu/mp/conf/io08/default.en.htm
Posted 4/25/08