Posted 4/1/08
CALL FOR PAPERS
TAX COMPETITION: HOW TO MEET THE NORMATIVE
AND POLITICAL CHALLENGE
Workshop at the Universite de Montreal,
organised in collaboration with the Centre de recherche
en ethique de l'Universite de Montreal (CREUM)
August 28 - 29, 2008
Deadline for abstracts: 15th April 2008
Abstract length: 750 words
On the back of technological change and the end of exchange
controls, capital mobility has over the last 30 or so years
led to increasing tax competition. By lowering tax rates on
individual savings as well as on corporate income,
governments hope to attract portfolio investment and
productive capital to their constituencies. Empirical
research has shown that individual countries do not always
benefit from tax competition, but might gain from
cooperation. In determining what form this cooperation
should take, two questions are of central importance:
1) What are the normative principles that should underlie
such international cooperation on fiscal policy?
Simultaneously, what other, conflicting normative
principles does such international cooperation have to
respect?
2) Which policies stand the best chance of implementing
the selected normative principles in practice?
The aim of the workshop is to critically assess existing
answers to these questions and potentially to come up with
new solutions. In bringing together researchers from
economics, law, and philosophy, the workshop hopes to build
on synergies between the different perspectives of these
disciplines that have not been previously seized upon.
CONFIRMED KEYNOTE SPEAKERS:
Reuven Avi-Yonah (Law School, University of Michigan): "The
OECD harmful tax competition report: A 10th anniversary
retrospective"
Philipp Genschel (Political Science, Jacobs University
Bremen): "Tax competition and democracy in the EU"
Richard Murphy (Tax Justice Network, UK): "Tax competition:
the view from the Crown Dependencies"
Michael Webb (Political Science, University of Victoria):
"Understanding and overcoming the neglect of distributional
questions in the OECD's response to international tax
competition"
TAX COMPETITION: THE THEMES OF THE DEBATE:
1) Tax competition significantly affects the distribution
of income both within and between countries.
Cosmopolitan theories of justice propose to evaluate the
resulting inequalities without attributing any normative
significance to national boundaries. On the other hand,
should sovereign states not be able, with certain
limits, to set fiscal policy according to their
citizens' preferences about the size of government? How
do we reconcile these two perspectives?
2) Does tax competition promote efficiency? If so, which
kind of efficiency? For example, does competitive
pressure on governments make them less wasteful?
Alternatively, does tax competition promote the
maximization of social welfare? What is the normative
status of these objectives?
3) Where to draw the line between legitimate and
illegitimate tax policies? For instance, are non-
differentiation rules that exclude ring-fencing and
other forms of targeted tax holidays sufficient? What
are the prospects of, say, the European Union (EU) or
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) implementing a satisfactory answer to
this type of question?
4) Addressing the negative aspects of tax competition is
likely to require different measures in the contexts of
taxing individuals as opposed to companies. Residence-
based taxation of the former may be combined with some
form of source-based taxation of the latter. What can we
learn from the important questions of feasibility that
act as side-constraints on these policy choices?
5) A related and complementary phenomenon to the
competition on tax rates is the competition on banking
regulations. For instance, tax havens are known for
their bank secrecy laws. On the one hand, these laws are
defended in the name of liberty. Yet, on the other hand,
they facilitate tax evasion. To what extent does fiscal
cooperation have to include cooperation on regulatory
frameworks to be effective?
6) Arguably, co-operation on tax competition would be in
many countries' best interest, except for those tax
havens that actually benefit from the status quo. At
what cost should the international community attempt to
persuade the countries in question to join a
multilateral agreement? Is there a point at which
positive incentives should give way to sanctions?
7) Calls for a World Tax Authority might be justified, but
always have a utopian flavour to them. What are the
prospects of meeting the normative and political
challenge of tax competition based on multilateral, but
not universal, co-operation on fiscal policy?
ORGANISATION OF THE WORKSHOP:
Since the principal aim of the workshop is to have a
sustained discussion on some of the above issues, the
number of participants will be limited. Presentations will
be grouped together according to topic, allowing sufficient
time for an in-depth discussion of each paper. The presence
of paper givers throughout the workshop will be essential.
PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE:
Please send a detailed abstract of about 750 words and a
short CV to:
Email: MAILTO:Peter.dietsch@umontreal.ca
by April 15th 2008.
Sincerely,
Peter Dietsch
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