SSRN Author: James BonoJames Bono SSRN Content
http://www.ssrn.com/author=1332613
http://www.ssrn.com/rss/en-usSun, 02 Jun 2013 01:28:58 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Sun, 02 Jun 2013 01:28:58 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: Groups, Groups of Groups, and Complex StabilityMany politically and economically important groups are themselves comprised of groups. Examples of such multilevel group structures include coalition governments, labor confederations and multinational agreements. This paper develops a model of multilevel group structures. The results establish the way in which individuals and groups will make trade-offs across levels of the multilevel structure. They also establish that overall stability and overall instability can both arise from any combinati
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2141489
http://www.ssrn.com/1210406.htmlSat, 01 Jun 2013 20:20:24 GMTNew: Sales Contests, Promotion Decisions and Heterogeneous RiskThis paper examines a general model of sales contests in which agents have heterogeneous attitudes towards risk. It shows that agents that are less risk averse have a higher probability of success. A corollary to this result shows that when absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, wealthier agents have a higher probability of promotion. The same wealth effect makes it possible for more risk averse agents to take greater risks in a multi-round promotion tournament. Next, a stability analys
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2272765
http://www.ssrn.com/1210069.htmlFri, 31 May 2013 16:12:56 GMTNew: Game Mining: How to Make Money from Those About to Play a GameIt is well-known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome- contingent contract with the players. We analyze various struc
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2243767
http://www.ssrn.com/1193133.htmlThu, 04 Apr 2013 14:59:48 GMTREVISION: Decision-Theoretic Prediction and Policy Design of GDP Slot AuctionsWe examine the potential for a simple auction to allocate arrival slots during Ground Delay Programs (GDP’s) more efficiently than the currently used sys- tem. The analysis of these auctions uses Predictive Game Theory (PGT) Wolpert and Bono (2010a,b), a new approach that produces a probability distribution over strategies instead of an equilibrium set. We compare the simple auction with other allocation methods, including combinatorial auctions and theoretical benchmarks using data from a one
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1815222
http://www.ssrn.com/1192706.htmlWed, 03 Apr 2013 13:21:20 GMTREVISION: Predicting Behavior in Unstructured Bargaining with a Probability DistributionIn experimental tests of human behavior in unstructured bargaining games, typically many joint utility outcomes are found to occur, not just one. This suggests we predict the outcome of such a game as a probability distribution. This is in contrast to what is conventionally done (e.g, in the Nash bargaining solution), which is predict a single outcome. We show how to translate Nash’s bargaining axioms to provide a distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome. We then prove that a su
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1709605
http://www.ssrn.com/1192717.htmlWed, 03 Apr 2013 13:16:13 GMTREVISION: Distribution-Valued Solution ConceptsUnder its conventional positive interpretation, game theory predicts that the mixed strategy profile of players in a particular noncooperative game will fall within some set determined by the game, e.g., the set of Nash equilibria of that game. Profiles outside of that set are implicitly assigned probability zero, and relative probabilities of profiles in that set are not given. In contrast, Bayesian rationality does not tell us to predict which state a system has by specifying a subset of its p
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1622463
http://www.ssrn.com/1192701.htmlWed, 03 Apr 2013 12:07:41 GMTREVISION: Groups, Groups of Groups, and Complex StabilityMany politically and economically important groups are themselves comprised of groups. Examples of such multilevel group structures include coalition governments, labor confederations and multinational agreements. This paper develops a model of multilevel group structures. The results establish the way in which individuals and groups will make trade-offs across levels of the multilevel structure. They also establish that overall stability and overall instability can both arise from any combinati
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2141489
http://www.ssrn.com/1133553.htmlWed, 05 Sep 2012 07:46:07 GMT