SSRN Author: Alfred GalichonAlfred Galichon SSRN Content
http://www.ssrn.com/author=483323
http://www.ssrn.com/rss/en-usFri, 10 Mar 2017 02:18:14 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Fri, 10 Mar 2017 02:18:14 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0New: Yogurts Choose Consumers? Identification of Random Utility Models via Two-Sided MatchingIn this paper we describe an equivalence between random utility discrete-choice models and two-sided matching models with imperfectly transferable utility, and we exploit its consequences. Based on it, we suggest new approaches for estimation and identification of non-additive random utility models (NARUM), in which the utility shocks do not affect decision-makers’ utilities in an additive manner. The estimation algorithms and procedures we describe are inspired by those in the matching literature. A noteworthy feature of our algorithms is that they yield the point estimate when the model is point identified, and yield the upper and lower bounds on the parameters under partial identification.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2928876
http://www.ssrn.com/1572495.htmlThu, 09 Mar 2017 06:01:22 GMTNew: A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets without Transfers, with an Application to Surge PricingMost of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers, where prices are regulated and thus cannot clear the market, as in the case of taxis. In these markets, time waited in line often plays the role of a numéraire. We investigate the properties of equilibrium in these markets (existence, uniqueness, and welfare). We use this analysis to study the problem of surge pricing: given beliefs on random demand and supply, how should a market designer set prices to minimize expected market inefficiency?
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2908532
http://www.ssrn.com/1562332.htmlTue, 31 Jan 2017 09:41:01 GMTREVISION: A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets Without Transfers, with an Application to Surge PricingMost of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers, where prices are regulated and thus cannot clear the market, as in the case of taxis. In these markets, time waited in line often plays the role of a numéraire. We investigate the properties of equilibrium in these markets (existence, uniqueness, and welfare). We use this analysis to study the problem of surge pricing: given beliefs on random demand and supply, how should a market designer set prices to minimize expected market inefficiency?
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2887732
http://www.ssrn.com/1558156.htmlSat, 14 Jan 2017 08:39:19 GMTREVISION: Estimating Matching Affinity Matrix under Low-Rank ConstraintsIn this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse problem of estimating matching affinity based on the observation of the joint distribution, using an entropic regularization of the problem. To accommodate high dimensionality of the data, we propose a novel method that incorporates a nuclear norm regularization which effectively enforces a rank constraint on the affinity matrix. The low-rank matrix estimated in this way reveals the main factors which are relevant for matching.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2889979
http://www.ssrn.com/1554682.htmlSat, 31 Dec 2016 04:21:29 GMTREVISION: Estimating Matching Affinity Matrix under Low-Rank ConstraintsIn this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse problem of estimating matching affinity based on the observation of the joint distribution, using an entropic regularization of the problem. To accommodate high dimensionality of the data, we propose a novel method that incorporates a nuclear norm regularization which effectively enforces a rank constraint on the affinity matrix. The low-rank matrix estimated in this way reveals the main factors which are relevant for matching.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2889979
http://www.ssrn.com/1554009.htmlTue, 27 Dec 2016 11:52:46 GMTNew: A Survey of Some Recent Applications of Optimal Transport Methods to EconometricsThis paper surveys recent applications of methods from the theory of optimal transport to econometric problems.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2888834
http://www.ssrn.com/1553329.htmlFri, 23 Dec 2016 06:01:08 GMTREVISION: A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets Without Transfers, with an Application to Surge PricingMost of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers, where prices are regulated and thus cannot clear the market, as in the case of taxis. In these markets, time waited in line often plays the role of a numéraire. We investigate the properties of equilibrium in these markets (existence, uniqueness, and welfare). We use this analysis to study the problem of surge pricing: given beliefs on random demand and supply, how should a market designer set prices to minimize expected market inefficiency?
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2887732
http://www.ssrn.com/1552448.htmlTue, 20 Dec 2016 07:40:20 GMTREVISION: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable UtilityWe introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We allow for the introduction of a very general class of unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. Under minimal assumptions, we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibria in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences. The second algorithm is more efficient, but applies only in the case when random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. As an application, we build a model of marriage with two-sided ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2535394
http://www.ssrn.com/1521399.htmlSun, 21 Aug 2016 14:29:04 GMTNew: Identification of Matching Complementarities: A Geometric ViewpointWe provide a geometric formulation of the problem of identification of the matching surplus function and we show how the estimation problem can be solved by the introduction of a generalized entropy function over the set of matchings.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2805852
http://www.ssrn.com/1510508.htmlThu, 07 Jul 2016 10:13:28 GMTNew: Identification of Matching Complementarities: A Geometric ViewpointWe provide a geometric formulation of the problem of identification of the matching surplus function and we show how the estimation problem can be solved by the introduction of a generalized entropy function over the set of matchings.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2805852
http://www.ssrn.com/1510507.htmlThu, 07 Jul 2016 10:13:07 GMTREVISION: Matching in Closed-Form: Equilibrium, Identification, and Comparative StaticsThis paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are normal, and when the heterogeneity in tastes is of the continuous logit type, as in Choo and Siow (2006), we show that the optimal matching distribution is also jointly normal and can be computed in closed form from the model primitives. Conversely, the quadratic surplus function can be identiﬁed from the optimal matching distribution, also in closed-form. The analytical formulas make it computationally easy to solve problems with even a very large number of matches and allow for quantitative predictions about the evolution of the solution as the technology and the characteristics of the matching populations change.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2510732
http://www.ssrn.com/1486837.htmlTue, 12 Apr 2016 13:50:57 GMTREVISION: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable UtilityWe introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We allow for the introduction of a very general class of unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. Under minimal assumptions, we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibria in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences. The second algorithm is more efficient, but applies only in the case when random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. As an application, we build a model of marriage with two-sided ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2535394
http://www.ssrn.com/1481566.htmlWed, 23 Mar 2016 15:29:00 GMT