SSRN Author: Alfred GalichonAlfred Galichon SSRN Content
http://www.ssrn.com/author=483323
http://www.ssrn.com/rss/en-usThu, 01 Dec 2016 12:32:01 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Thu, 01 Dec 2016 12:32:01 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable UtilityWe introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We allow for the introduction of a very general class of unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. Under minimal assumptions, we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibria in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences. The second algorithm is more efficient, but applies only in the case when random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. As an application, we build a model of marriage with two-sided ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2535394
http://www.ssrn.com/1521399.htmlSun, 21 Aug 2016 14:29:04 GMTNew: Identification of Matching Complementarities: A Geometric ViewpointWe provide a geometric formulation of the problem of identification of the matching surplus function and we show how the estimation problem can be solved by the introduction of a generalized entropy function over the set of matchings.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2805852
http://www.ssrn.com/1510508.htmlThu, 07 Jul 2016 10:13:28 GMTNew: Identification of Matching Complementarities: A Geometric ViewpointWe provide a geometric formulation of the problem of identification of the matching surplus function and we show how the estimation problem can be solved by the introduction of a generalized entropy function over the set of matchings.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2805852
http://www.ssrn.com/1510507.htmlThu, 07 Jul 2016 10:13:07 GMTREVISION: Matching in Closed-Form: Equilibrium, Identification, and Comparative StaticsThis paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are normal, and when the heterogeneity in tastes is of the continuous logit type, as in Choo and Siow (2006), we show that the optimal matching distribution is also jointly normal and can be computed in closed form from the model primitives. Conversely, the quadratic surplus function can be identiﬁed from the optimal matching distribution, also in closed-form. The analytical formulas make it computationally easy to solve problems with even a very large number of matches and allow for quantitative predictions about the evolution of the solution as the technology and the characteristics of the matching populations change.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2510732
http://www.ssrn.com/1486837.htmlTue, 12 Apr 2016 13:50:57 GMTREVISION: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable UtilityWe introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We allow for the introduction of a very general class of unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. Under minimal assumptions, we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibria in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences. The second algorithm is more efficient, but applies only in the case when random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. As an application, we build a model of marriage with two-sided ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2535394
http://www.ssrn.com/1481566.htmlWed, 23 Mar 2016 15:29:00 GMTREVISION: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable UtilityWe introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We allow for the introduction of a very general class of unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. Under minimal assumptions, we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibria in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences. The second algorithm is more efficient, but applies only in the case when random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a particularly simple expression and we compute its derivatives. As an application, we build a model of marriage with ...
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2535394
http://www.ssrn.com/1457316.htmlMon, 04 Jan 2016 15:55:52 GMTNew: Duality in Dynamic Discrete Choice ModelsUsing results from convex analysis, we investigate a novel approach to identification and estimation of discrete choice models which we call the “Mass Transport Approach” (MTA). We show that the conditional choice probabilities and the choicespecific payoffs in these models are related in the sense of conjugate duality, and that the identification problem is a mass transport problem. Based on this, we propose a new two-step estimator for these models; interestingly, the first step of our estimator involves solving a linear program which is identical to the classic assignment (two-sided matching) game of Shapley and Shubik (1971). The application of convex-analytic tools to dynamic discrete choice models, and the connection with two-sided matching models, is new in the literature.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2700773
http://www.ssrn.com/1451465.htmlWed, 09 Dec 2015 12:42:13 GMTNew: Optimal Transport Methods in EconomicsThis is a preliminary draft of the manuscript of my textbook "Optimal Transport Methods in Economics" (to appear), based on lectures given at MIT in Spring 2015. The present preprint version is circulated to invite comments by readers.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2699381
http://www.ssrn.com/1451299.htmlWed, 09 Dec 2015 07:26:19 GMT