How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates From a Dynamic Model

Posted: 6 May 2018

See all articles by Anastasia A. Zakolyukina

Anastasia A. Zakolyukina

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2018

Abstract

This paper uses data on detected misstatements — earnings restatements — and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five‐year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost implies a high fraction of CEOs who misstate earnings at least once at 60%, with 2%–22% of CEOs starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003–2010, inflation in stock prices across CEOs who misstate earnings at 2.02%, and inflation in stock prices across all CEOs at 0.77%. Wealthier CEOs manipulate less, and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms.

Keywords: earnings manipulation; executive compensation; earnings restatements

JEL Classification: G34; G38; K22; K42; M41

Suggested Citation

Zakolyukina, Anastasia A., How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates From a Dynamic Model (March 1, 2018). Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165581

Anastasia A. Zakolyukina (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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