Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses

51 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2001

See all articles by Per Strömberg

Per Strömberg

Swedish House of Finance; ECGI; CEPR

Steven N. Kaplan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. We then consider the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. We interpret these results in relation to financial contracting theories.

JEL Classification: G24, G32

Suggested Citation

Stromberg, Per and Kaplan, Steven Neil, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses (January 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=295109 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.295109

Per Stromberg (Contact Author)

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

ECGI ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hhs.se/en/houseoffinance/about/people/people-container/per-stromberg/

Steven Neil Kaplan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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773-702-0458 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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