Scholars’ Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Support of Neither Party: Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

46 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2014 Last revised: 10 Feb 2014

See all articles by Douglas Laycock

Douglas Laycock

University of Virginia School of Law

Mark P. Gergen

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Doug Rendleman

Washington and Lee University - School of Law

Date Written: January 8, 2014

Abstract

The appeal to the Supreme Court in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer deals with the equitable defense of plaintiff’s laches before suing for copyright infringement. Laches is unreasonable and prejudicial delay. MGM allegedly violated plaintiff’s copyright repeatedly over a period of many years; the statute of limitations has not run on the most recent violations. Plaintiff argues that laches should never apply to a cause of action with a statute of limitations. Defendant argues that laches should bar all relief if defendant relied on plaintiff’s failure to sue earlier, without having to match defendant’s reliance to the remedies plaintiff seeks.

This scholars’ amicus brief, which supports neither party, argues against all-or-nothing solutions. In particular, the brief says that laches should be available as needed to protect defendant’s reliance, but that defendant should have to show how particular remedies would unfairly override particular reliance interests. Plaintiff also argues that laches should be unavailable because it would be a ground for refusing an injunction that was not mentioned in eBay v. MercExchange. The scholars’ brief takes this occasion to point out several unintended untoward consequences of the four-part test in eBay.

Keywords: Copyright, Equity, Laches, Estoppel, Irreparable injury

JEL Classification: K10, K20

Suggested Citation

Laycock, Douglas and Gergen, Mark P. and Rendleman, Doug, Scholars’ Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Support of Neither Party: Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (January 8, 2014). Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper, Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2014-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376302 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376302

Douglas Laycock

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

Mark P. Gergen

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

Doug Rendleman (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University - School of Law ( email )

Lexington, VA 24450
United States

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