The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment

53 Pages Posted: 25 May 2006 Last revised: 29 Nov 2022

See all articles by Raghuram G. Rajan

Raghuram G. Rajan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Henri Servaes

London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1998

Abstract

In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions. The distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm's divisions. We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the U.S. during the period 1979-1993. We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions; iii) the discount at which these diversified firms trade is positively related to the extent of the investment mis-allocation and to the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions.

Suggested Citation

Rajan, Raghuram G. and Servaes, Henri and Zingales, Luigi, The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment (January 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6368, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=226117

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