Failed States, Vicious Cycles, and a Proposal
14 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2011
Date Written: March 2, 2011
Abstract
Rajan examines the problems of failed states, including the repeated return to power of former warlords, which he argues causes institutions to become weaker and people to get poorer. He notes that economic power through property holdings or human capital gives people the means to hold their leaders accountable. In the absence of such distributed power, dictators reign. Rajan argues that in failed states, economic growth leading to empowered citizenry is more likely if a neutral party presides. He proposes a unique solution to allow the electorate to choose a foreigner, who would govern for a fixed term. Candidates could be proposed by the UN or retired leaders from other countries; they would campaign on a platform to build the basic foundations of government and create a sustainable distribution of power. Rajan emphasizes that this is not a return to the colonial model – the external candidate (like all the others) would be on a ballot and the electorate would choose whether he or she was their best chance to escape fragility.
Keywords: failed states, institutions, economic power, human capital, governmental accountability
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Preferences for Redistribution
By Alberto F. Alesina and Paola Giuliano
-
Preferences for Redistribution
By Alberto F. Alesina and Paola Giuliano
-
Preferences for Redistribution
By Alberto F. Alesina and Paola Giuliano
-
Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: the Poum Hypothesis
By Roland Bénabou and Efe A. Ok
-
Why Doesn't the Us Have a European-Style Welfare State?
By Alberto F. Alesina, Edward L. Glaeser, ...
-
Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole