Media versus Special Interests

50 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2008

See all articles by I. J. Alexander Dyck

I. J. Alexander Dyck

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

David A. Moss

Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2008

Abstract

We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.

Keywords: media, muckraking, regulation

JEL Classification: L51, N41, P16

Suggested Citation

Dyck, I.J. Alexander and Moss, David A. and Zingales, Luigi, Media versus Special Interests (October 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6994, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1308065

I.J. Alexander Dyck

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S 3E6
Canada
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David A. Moss

Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States

Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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